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1ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the possible short-run economic 
gains from implementing a different system of road pricing in 
Oslo, Norway. Oslo is the largest city in Norway, with a 
population of 450, 000 inhabitants.
First, the existing cordon toll ring that forces all inbound 
traffic to pay a flat toll to enter the central business district 
24 hours a day is described. Second, the literature on optimal 
road pricing is investigated. Third, the flat tariff toll system 
is compared to two differentiated pricing systems that better 
reflect the costs imposed by drivers on society. When the loss of 
surplus and gains because of time savings for the pricing systems 
are compared with revenues collected, it is possible to conclude 
that more differentiated pricing increase economic welfare. More 
differentiated prices are also closer to the theoretical solution 
for optimal road pricing.
2CHAPTER 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION.
In Norway the supply of roads is less than the demand for 
roads, especially in urban areas. This is because roads are 
mainly financed by government funds, and the government gives 
rural roads priority over urban roads. The reason for this is 
that in large parts of the rural districts viable alternatives to 
road transportation do not exist. The result has been slow 
development of roads in urban areas. Increasing urbanization is 
another factor that makes it harder to solve the road capacity 
problems in the largest cities.
The result is increasing congestion on parts of the road 
network, with longer travel times and environmental problems as a 
consequense. In Norway these problems are relatively small 
compared to the largest cities in Euroupe, Asia and the U.S.A, 
but it is of interest to investigate if it is possible to use the 
price mechanism to solve these congestion problems.
This thesis attemps to analyze the short-run impacts of 
alternative road pricing systems. It will be shown that 
differentiated tolls by time of day will yield an economic gain 
to society compared to the present toll scheme where a flat rate 
toll is collected 24 hours a day. Differentiated tariffs mean 
that the toll is higher during rush hours when congestion is
3high, and lower during off-peak hours when congestion is low. 
Compared to a flat toll, higher tolls during rush hours reduce 
traffic flows, congestion and driving times and lower tolls 
during off-peak hours increase traffic flows. The result is more 
even traffic levels during the day which reduce the total social 
cost of transportation.
In this thesis the impacts of alternative road pricing 
systems are determined and evaluated given the existing demand 
for and supply of roads. This short-run analysis has its 
limitation. In the long-run, road and public transit improvements 
financed by tolls and changes in demand will alter the costs and 
benefits of the alternative road pricing systems. A complete 
cost-benefit analysis would incorporate these long-run changes, 
determine net benefits in each time period, and determine the 
present discounted value of net benefits. Such a long-run 
analysis is not within the scope of this thesis, but the long-run 
implications of the short-run results will be explored.
Hau(1991) and Walters(1968) derived the theoretical 
solutions to the road congestion problem. These authors describe 
how in theory marginal cost pricing would result in the optimal 
use of existing roads and an optimal sized road system. In this 
thesis, the theory of optimal congestion tolls is presented, the 
practical limitations of the theory are discussed and the impact 
of a more practical system of differentiated tolls are 
determined, evaluated, and compared to the impacts of the current 
flat rate toll system.
4The thesis is organized in the following manner: The 
remainder of this chapter provides background information on the 
Oslo, Norway toll ring including the rationale for and the 
structure of the toll ring. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on 
road pricing. The theoretical solution to marginal cost pricing 
of existing roads, and optimal road investments are presented and 
the results of road pricing in Singapore, in the U.S.A. and in 
Oslo are described. In chapter 3, four scenarios with different 
road pricing systems are developed, simulated and evaluated. The 
results indicated that compared with the present pricing system 
the most differentiated scheme generates the largest total 
traffic, but with less congestion during the rush hours. A 
discussion of the distributional effects of the toll ring and its 
effects on land use and commercial traffic closes the chapter.
In chapter 4 the time savings resulting from the toll ring are 
analyzed. Any increase in road prices will reduce traffic 
volumes. This reduction harms those who alter the number or times 
of their trips, reduces travel times which benefits those drivers 
who do not alter their travel behavior and affects total toll 
revenue. According to the analysis the present toll scheme 
collects the most revenue, but the case with the largest 
differentiation yields the largest social net benefits mainly 
because of the value of time savings.
The thesis concludes that the results of a pricing system 
with differentiated tolls by time of day are more desirable than 
the results of the present pricing system. A differentiated toll
5system is closer to the theoretical optimal pricing system, and 
creates more even traffic flows over the day. An additional 
benefit of a differentiated pricing system is that it reduces the 
need for increased road capacity.
1.1 Costs to drivers and to society because of the use of 
vehicles, and the meaning of road pricing.
Drivers should generally face the costs to society resulting 
from their vehicle use. From an economic point of view, this is 
necessary for the potential vehicles users to take a "correct" 
desicion concerning the means of tranportation, the time of 
travel and the travel route.
The cost components that must be included in calculating the 
cost of vehicles use include:
Costs to society: Private costs:
-Wear and tear on -Operating costs of the vehicle
roads included insurance and vehicle
taxes
-Travel time for drivers 
and passengers
-Travel time for driver 
and passengers
6-Risk of accidents for 
driver and passengers
-Increased risk of accidents 
for other traffic
-Increased operating costs 
for other traffic
-Increased travel times for 
other traffic
-Increased environmental costs 
because of pollution
Some of these costs are borne by the driver, and other costs are 
borne by the society.
Whether the drivers7 private costs reflect the costs to 
society is dependent on the size and form of the taxes on 
ownership and usage of the vehicle. Valuation of environmental 
costs and the cost of traffic accidents is important in 
determining if the trafficants cover the full cost of using the 
roads. The taxes that drivers pay should reflect society's 
judgement of these costs.
Optimal road pricing is a form of taxation where all the 
external effects of a trip by a vehicle are calculated in
-Risk of accidents for 
driver and passengers
7monetary terms and presented as a user price. In this thesis this 
notion is reduced to the external effects drivers impose on each 
other. A consequence of this is that the user price must vary 
continually with the traffic level on each road link. Such a 
system is troublesome and expensive to implement on a real world 
road network. Alternative systems that could be implemented are 
effective to a certain degree depending upon the similarity to 
the optimal system; that is, how differentiated the tariffs are 
with respect to time.
Implementation of optimal road pricing will yield benefits 
for society. Some drivers alter the number and/or times of their 
trips and their loss is less than the time savings gain for the 
rest of the traffic. Optimal road pricing also produces revenue 
for the authorities. Since this revenue reflects the users 
willingness to pay for the roads, it signals whether road 
improvements are desirable and where they should be mode. Optimal 
investment strategy implies that the authorities allocate road 
investments in such a way that at the margin revenues equal the 
construction costs.
There are also environmental costs to society caused by 
drivers. Such costs are air and noise pollution that increase 
with traffic volumes. In the Oslo region these costs have 
increased over time. These costs should be reduced in the future 
by road improvements which will include tunnels that will allow 
through traffic to bypass the central city and roads in areas 
where population density is lower. These environmental costs are
8not explicitly included in this thesis.
There are practical problems, in implementing a theoretical 
optimal road pricing system. In the real world it is difficult to 
build optimal sized roads because the demand for road capacity 
fluctuates over the day. In addition, in urban areas travellers 
have a choice among several modes of transportation. Intermodel 
choice makes it difficult to make accurate predictions about the 
impact of road investments on traffic levels.
1.1.1 Background information on the toll ring in Oslo, Norway.
This section provides background information on the Oslo 
toll ring. First the forces, political and traffic management 
concerns that led to the toll ring, are discussed. Also, the 
technical and financial outcomes of the electronic road pricing 
in Oslo are discussed.
1.1.2 Political and traffic management concerns.
The growth in traffic during the last two decades has led to 
congestion on the main roads around the largest cities in Norway. 
In Oslo, the largest city and the capital of Norway, the problem 
has evolved from congestion during the rush hours to congestion 
during most of the day. Congestion has worsened local 
environmental and traffic safety problems. Traffic forecasts
9indicate that congestion is expected to increase over time. 
Ambitious plans for urban motorways in Oslo were made thirty 
years ago. Opposition from politicians and citizens who were 
concerned about the impact these motorways would have on the 
urban environment, and the lack of funds for such an extensive 
road improvements, caused only fragments of these plans to be 
realized (Stortingsmelding nr.46, 1985-86). Improving the public 
transport system was the preferred solution to the growing road 
traffic. Oslo's metro was expanded with funds from the local 
government. Even though the expansion led to increased travel by 
public transportation, road traffic still increased. One possible 
reason for this is that the ticket prices for public 
transportation increased more than the price on gasoline (Aldrin 
1991). Since rural districts are given priority, only limited 
road funds have been allocated by the national government to 
Oslo. Therefore, planners had to look at alternative ways of 
financing road improvements.
For these reasons, a toll ring was introduced to finance the 
road network in Oslo on February 1, 1990. As an inducement, the 
national government agreed to increase its funds for road 
investment in Oslo so that national government funds would 
approximately match the income from the toll road system. If the 
new road system was financed only by national governmental 
funding, it would take 35 years to complete. Toll money in 
addition to national governmental funds would make it possible to 
complete 50 new road projects at a cost of NOK 12 billion (USD
10
1.7 billion) in only 15 years.
User charges for the roads were discussed, beginning in 1980 
(Stortingsmelding nr. 46). The local political administration 
asked planners to develop different financing systems that would 
achieve two goals. First, raise money for construction of new 
roads and improvements to old roads, public transportation and 
some special facilities for pedestrians and bicyclists. Second, 
restrain traffic during rush hours. The proposed systems were a 
toll ring, road pricing based on areas (an area lisencing 
scheme), and higher parking fees. The placement of the toll ring, 
at the Ringveien, Kirkeveien or the Center ring, see enclosure 1, 
was also discussed.
Two factors which caused the city government to choose the 
toll ring option were the proposed tunnel under the city and the 
estimated cost to business of traffic congestion.
In 1984 a plan for building a tunnel under the city to allow 
traffic from the west to the north and south to avoid passing 
through the center of the city was developed. This plan was 
approved in 1986. The tunnel was to be financed by tolls, but 
people could avoid paying the toll by driving through the city 
center. In 1983 the Institute of Transport Economics (Larsen 
1985) estimated that businesses in Oslo annually lost NOK 500 
million due to traffic congestion on the roads into and out of 
the city. The city government decided to establish a toll ring in 
December 1987, and two years and one month later, this toll ring 
was imp1emented.
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Although the city government decided that the toll ring 
should be built, it had very little support among the residents 
of Oslo. Their resistance was based primarily on equity concerns. 
Many thought it was unequitable that drivers should pay more than 
they already did, and that some drivers depending on where they 
lived and worked had to pay while others did not. Variations in 
the distance from the toll ring to the central business district 
(CBD) are the reason that people perceive a geographical 
unfairness according to the survey results by Solheim in 1991.
Many were also concerned about the large investments and the 
cost of a toll ring system, and they believed that the funds for 
road improvements should be raised by a larger tax on cars and/or 
a higher gasoline tax. The opinion polls show that the public 
opinion of the toll ring is less negative today, but still about 
one half of the public opposes it (Solheim 1991 and Simonsen 
1991) .
1.1.3 Structure of the toll ring.
The population of the Oslo-region is approximately 700,000. 
Oslo is located at the north end of the Oslofjord with large 
greenbelt areas to the north and the east. Built up areas and 
roads form three corridors leading to the central parts of Oslo.
A total of 19 toll plazas of various sizes form a cordon line 
cutting across these corridors, and the driver of each vehicle 
must pay a toll to drive into the city. However, the toll is not
12
collected when vehicles leave the city. The Oslo toll ring is 
designed so that it is impossible to enter the city without 
paying the toll. The toll stations are placed from 3 to 8 
kilometers outside the center of the city (see enclosure 1). To 
complete the ring, five local roads have been closed or converted 
to one way travel to prevent drivers from avoiding the toll.
There are three types of lanes in the toll plazas: manual, 
automatic, and subscriber's lanes. The drivers pay an attendant 
in the manual lane or use a coin machine in the automatic lane. 
Cars in these lanes must stop to pay, reducing the traffic 
capacity to approximately 400 cars per hour per lane. In the 
subscription lanes, cars pass at normal speed without stopping, 
allowing a capacity of 1600 cars per hour: four times that of the 
manual lanes.
The subscriber, system is based on an identification tag 
mounted on the inside of the vehicle's front windshield. A 
"reader" mounted over the subscription lane records the tag's 
identification code. The information is transferred to a computer 
system which determines the tag's validity. This procedure takes 
less than 0.4 seconds. If the tag is not valid, or the car has no 
tag, the driver is informed by a yellow traffic signal and a 
video-picture is taken of the passing car. To protect the 
passenger's privacy they are not included in the picture. The 
owner of the vehicle is then assessed a fine of NOK 250. The 
number of drivers who try to cross the toll ring without paying 
is relatively small, 0.1 percent.
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The amount of the toll is constant 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. However, drivers who purchase subscriptions receive 
discounts. The discounts are intended to encourage drivers to 
utilize "no stop" lanes and thus, reduce or avoid car queues in 
the manual lanes. When the toll ring was first established, this 
enticement was important; therefore, drivers received a 25 
percent discount from the normal subscription price if they 
bought annual subscription before January 15, 1990. This campaign 
was successful and resulted in about 50 percent of all crossings 
occurring in the "no stop" lanes from the first day. During 
February 1994, about 64 percent of all traffic through the toll 
ring used the subscription lanes. This traffic used either season 
tickets or clipcards. Season tickets allow an unlimited number of 
crossings during a one month, six month or an annual period. The 
clipcards allow either 25, 175 or 350 crossings. Each time the 
vehicle crosses the toll ring its electronic tag is debited.
When the vehicle enters the toll station and there are fewer than 
10 crossings left on the card, a signal with a white cross 
informs the driver that it is time to renew the card. The 
different tariffs are listed in table 1.1.1.
For a commuter who crosses the toll ring once a day for the 
entire year, the price per crossing with an annual subscription 
is NOK 7. The more a driver with a subscription crosses the toll 
ring the cheaper the price per crossing becomes. For example, 
with a 3 50 crossings clipcard the price becomes NOK 7.7.
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Table 1.1.1: Tariffs for crossing the Oslo toll ring. 
Reference: Fjellinjen A/S.
Way of payment Light vehicles 
(under 3500 kilos)
Single ticket 11 NOK
One month 260 NOK
Six month 1,400 NOK
Annual 2,600 NOK
Clipcards:
25 240 NOK
175 1,500 NOK
350 2,700 NOK
July 21, 1994, USD 1 = NOK 6.8. Heavy vehicles (over 3,500 kilos) 
pay twice as much.
This pricing policy reduces the cost per crossing for 
frequent users who often are peak hour users. Such a policy is 
not an optimal road pricing policy. In fact, congestion pricing 
suggests that those who use the roads at peak hours pay the 
highest price. Pressure from businesses whose vehicles cross the 
toll ring many times a day and commuters may have resulted in the 
choice of a flat tariff.
With respect to traffic congestion and minimization of 
collection costs, the toll ring has been a success. Except for 
one toll plaza where the manual lane is overloaded during the 
tourist season, there have been no traffic problems at the toll 
plazas.
Today, 19 of the original 50 road projects have been 
completed. Traffic flow and environmental conditions in the city 
center have improved as a result of these projects (NILU, 1992) . 
Approximately 3 0 of the road projects are tunnels which remove
15
cars from the city streets. One of the main projects which has 
been completed is the Oslo Tunnel, that allows 70,000 cars per 
weekday to bypass the CBD. This project allowed the City Hall 
Square to be transformed from a traffic inferno to a public park 
between the water front and the City Hall. The completed projects 
increased traffic speeds through Oslo reducing travel times and 
benefiting drivers.
The new roads have not eliminated the need for an efficient 
public transportation system. This system needs to be further 
developed to prevent future road congestion. Therefore, about 2 0 
percent of the income from the toll road system is allocated to
improve public transport infrastructure.
1.1.4 Financial outcomes.
In 1993, 207,000 vehicles passed through the toll ring each 
day, comprising almost 40 percent of all trips in the Oslo 
region. The revenue from the toll collection is approximately NOK 
63 0 million (90 mill. USD) per year, and operational expenses 
represent about 11 percent of this total. When all 50 projects 
are fully financed, and the liabilities and share capital of the 
company that is in charge of the toll ring are repaid, it is 
assumed that the toll plazas will be removed, and the company 
dissolved. Given the experience and revenues so far and the long
term budget, the company should be dissolved in 2007.
16
Conclusion.
The toll ring in Oslo functions well and serves its purpose: 
to collect revenue for further road building. These revenues have 
financed new roads and tunnels and increased capacity for public 
transportation. These investments have already reduced air 
pollution and traffic congestion in the CBD.
1.2 Attitudes towards the toll ring.
The desicion to build a cordon toll ring to finance road 
investments in the Oslo region, was made by the local government, 
but the desicion was opposed by many groups. This section 
discusses public opinion concerning the toll ring.
Mail surveys were undertaken to investigate the public's 
opinions about the toll ring both before and after the 
implementation of the toll ring. About 1,000 persons over 18 
years of age, who lived in the Oslo region, were interviewed by 
telephone about their attitudes concerning the toll ring before 
and after it was imposed (Solheim 1991). Later two more studies 
of people's attitudes concerning this issue, were undertaken 
independently of the first study (Stangeby, April, November 
1991). The results of these surveys were similar with about 60 
percent reacting negatively to the toll ring in 1990. In the 
latter studies, the percentage with a negative opinion was a bit 
lower than in the former studies (See table 1.2.1.). Not only did 
the share with a negative attitude decline, but also the very
17
negative share decreased by 9 percent.
Surprisingly, the population's opinions did not become more 
positive after the system was introduced, as happened in Bergen a 
few years earlier. The reason for this difference could be that 
people that live near the coast1 are more accustomed to
Table 1.2.1: Attitudes about the toll ring, 1989 and 1990, in 
percent. Reference: Solheim 1991.
Attitude 1989 1990
Very negative 37 28
Fairly negative 28 65 32 60
Fairly positive 22 28
Very positive 7 29 6 34
Don't know 6 6
Total 100 100
toll-roads because they frequently use bridges and ferries. In
the Oslo region, people are not accustomed to user charges for 
roads, and this lack of familiarity may be the reason for their 
skepticism. In addition, people are generally skeptical of 
politicians and their promises, and many doubt that the collected 
toll revenues will be used for its original purposes or may not 
value the project financed by toll revenues highly.
The reduction in the negative attitude from 1989 to 1990 was 
among men, people from 45 to 59 years of age, people with high 
incomes, and people who lived in Oslo but outside the toll ring.
Bergen is located near the western coast in Norway.
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Knowledge about the toll ring seems to have been widespread by 
the autumn of 1990. Ninety-four percent knew the cost for a 
single crossing, but only 10 percent knew how much a monthly 
ticket cost. In 1989 only about one half of the people asked knew 
the cost of a single crossing.
For the question, "Why the toll ring was built," about two 
out of three correctly answered that it would help finance 
further road construction, and about 1 out of 3 that it also was 
to limit traffic, but this second group decreased from 1989 to 
199 0 (See table 1.2.2.) The most striking fact was that the 
group who thought that the money was collected for the government 
increased from 13 to 24 percent.
Most of the people who were favorable to the toll ring in 
1989 believed that it was designed to decrease traffic 
congestion. This share was lower in 199 0 while the group who 
thought this was a good way to collect money for road projects 
increased from 30 to 40 percent.
Typical negative opinions were "drivers already pay enough", 
and "it is an expensive way of collecting money". Many were also 
negative because they believed that it would create problems with 
queues. The last reason was hardly mentioned in 1990. In 1989 
almost 40 percent thought that the toll ring would cause them to 
make fewer auto trips and more trips with public transportation.
In 1990 this share had declined to under 2 0 percent. Implications 
of these responses are that people will change their attitude and 
eventually view the toll ring as a good thing, and use their
19
Table 1.2.2: Opinions about why the toll ring is/will be built 
in Oslo in percent. Reference: Solheim 1991.
Opinions 1989 1990
Money for roads 64 66
Money for "Fjellinjen"2 6 8
Constrain traffic 32 23
Environmental use 10 9
Increase public transport 4 8
More money to the Government 13 24
Do not know 3 4
Number of answers 1, 015 1, 010
(The percentages do not add up to 100 because people could choose 
more than one answer.)
vehicles more in the future.
In the autumn of 1990, 54 percent of all families with a car 
bought a subscription card of some kind. The most common purchase 
was a one year card that 26 percent bought while 5 percent bought 
1/2 year cards, and 3 percent one month cards. Employers covered 
the costs for 43 percent of those who purchased subscription. The 
share that received support from their employer differed 
depending on the type of subscription. Fifty percent of those 
with one year subscriptions were covered, while only 18 percent 
of one month and six month subscription were paid for by 
employers.
The share of subscription cards and the share of these cards 
covered by the employer also increased with the number of cars in 
the family and with the families' income. Among families with an 
income of 250,000 NOK and up, 62 percent bought subscription, and
2"Fjellinjen" is the name of the tunnel under the city- 
center of Oslo, from south-west to north.
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for 50 percent of the families the cost was covered by their 
employers. The numbers are similar for families with two or more 
cars.
Drivers with subscriptions are even more likely to have a 
negative opinion of the toll-ring (65%) than drivers without them 
(59%). These results are significant at the 10 percent level.
This attitude is independent of whether or not their subscription 
cards are covered by their firm. There appears to be a general 
negative attitude towards the toll ring, and this negative 
attitude is independent of the personal additional costs or of 
income.
Conclusion.
The opinion surveys indicate that after experiencing the 
toll ring auto drivers have less negative opinions, but the 
general attitude is still negative. This negative attitude is 
distributed equally among income groups. The reason for the 
general negative attitude is that people probably understand that 
their gains of the toll ring are less than their costs. In the 
long-run the benefits for most people will hopefully exceed the 
costs, and then the public opinion may also change.
21
CHAPTER 2
2.0 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This chapter begins with an explanation of the theoretical 
solutions to the optimal road pricing and investment problems 
based on T. Hau's and A. Walter's work. However, the primary 
objective of the Oslo toll ring was to collect revenue to finance 
road improvements in the Oslo region and not to control 
congestion. Previous investigations of road pricing in Singapore 
and in the U.S.A, and the experience with the Oslo toll ring are 
also reviewed in this chapter.
2.1.1. Introduction to road pricing theory.
In this section, the relationship between travel time and 
the number of vehicles on a road is first discussed. Based on 
this relationship the optimal toll fee is derived and the use of 
revenue from such a toll to finance optimal road investments in a 
road network is described.
Travel time and the number of vehicles on the road are used 
to determine an optimal toll that varies with respect to time of 
day. This congestion toll forces drivers to take into 
consideration the extra travel times they impose to others. The 
use of congestion tolls to internalize the external costs
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increases economic welfare.
The costs to society in form of longer travel times caused 
by congestion can be reduced by investments in road capacity. 
Optimal congestions tolls not only result in the efficient use of 
existing roads, but also indicate optimal road investments and 
provide the revenue required to finance these investments. 
Walter's "Putty-model" which is used to determine an optimal user 
fee and road investment for each traffic level is discussed in 
the last part of this section.
2.1.2 What is road pricing?
Among economists, concerns about optimal user fees for 
roads have a long tradition. The Norwegian Parliament's recent 
debates concerning the possibility of using the price mechanism 
to regulate traffic, rather than only using it to raise revenue 
for road projects, has made road pricing a household word in 
Norway.
When road congestion occurs, an additional vehicle imposes 
additional costs on all in the form of longer travel times. These 
costs include higher vehicle operating costs primarily gasoline 
expences and the environmental impacts of additional air and 
noise pollution.
In principle, optimal road prices should include the costs 
of all these external effects in a user fee paid by the driver. 
These costs can be collected in different ways. The advantages
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and disadvantages of different systems of road pricing are 
discussed in the following sections.
2.1.3 Marginal cost road pricing.
In a theoretically ideal system of road pricing, the road 
user pays for all the costs he/she imposes on other drivers. The 
toll for each road link in the road system must vary continually 
with traffic on that road. In practice, such an ideal system 
would be hard to implement. First, it would be difficult to 
develop computer programs to calculate the ideal prices for a 
road system where traffic fluctuates. Second, even if this were 
possible, it would be very expensive to implement such a pricing 
system. Third, under this system a driver would not know the 
amount of money he/she had to pay for using a road link until 
after the costs he/she had imposed on others were calculated. 
Under such a complex system prices would no longer function as 
signals to the road users3.
It is possible to create a system that can overcome the 
first of these problems, but the other problems remain. At the 
time this thesis is written, ideal marginal cost road pricing has 
not been implemented anywhere in the world.
This approach is still of some importance because there 
exist models that are able to measure traffic volumes within a
3 When prices for the use of a certain road link increases, 
it is supposed to prevent congestion on the link. Therefore it is 
important that users know the price before they use the road.
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time period for a given road network. These models assume that 
all information about travel time and costs for each travel 
route, are known a priori. Using these models one is able to 
estimate the social benefits of implementing a toll for road use, 
(Jean-Hansen, 1991).
In practice one operates with prices, or taxes, that are 
known in advance. Drivers impose different costs on each other 
depending upon the time of the day. Therefore, the prices should 
also vary by time of day. These systems will be effective if they 
are close to the ideal, this means, they should vary directly 
with traffic volumes.
It is also possible to differentiate the prices with respect 
to places in the road network. Higher prices for highly congested 
places would divert traffic elsewhere improving traffic flows. It 
is also possible to divide a city area into different zones and 
vary prices by zone, for example higher prices in the center and 
lower prices further from the center.
A combination of prices differentiated by time and zone 
would be similar to an ideal marginal costs pricing system, but 
would imply large construction costs because collection of 
revenue would be more difficult.
World-wide experience with advanced road pricing systems is 
limited and road pricing experience in Norway has been limited to 
toll rings, a relatively crude form of road pricing. The existing 
toll rings do not differentiate prices with respect to the amount 
of traffic. Thus the existing road pricing system provides no
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differential incentives for users to change their time of travel 
or choice of route. The impacts of such a flat toll are 
determined and evaluated in chapter 3.
2.1.4 A theoretical approach.
This section provides a theoretical approach to optimal road 
pricing in the short run. The use of an uncongested road network 
is similar to the consumption of a public good. A driver's use of 
the road network will not have any negative implications for 
other drivers. The marginal driver will in other words not impose 
any negative external effects on the other users of the road, and 
the marginal external costs on society will be close to zero4.
When congestion occurs on the road network it is a form of 
external cost. The price of a private good is determined by the 
critera of demand or willingness to pay and supply. In a road 
network with congestion, this price includes the extra time the 
drivers uses because of traffic congestion. The additional time 
costs imposed on other drivers are not included in a driver's 
economic costs, and are therefore an external cost. To 
effectively utilize the existing roads, requires a mechanism that 
excludes drivers who have a lower willingness to pay than the 
marginal cost to society. Excluding drivers from the use of the 
road network may sound harsh, but it need not imply anything more
4 The environmental costs caused by increased vehicles use 
are not mentioned, but increased congestion will lead to 
increased air and noise pollution.
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than car pooling, travelling at a different time of the day, or 
increased use of public transportation.
In situations with excessive congestion, the marginal costs 
to society exceed the marginal benefits. Thus even small 
reductions in traffic imply net social benefits. Excessive 
congestion, can be looked upon as a market failure were 
mispricing causes too many drivers to use the road network. 
Economists argue that the use of roads should be rationed by a 
price mechanism.
The theoretical analysis begins by postulating a 
relationship between travel times and the number of vehicles 
using the roads. Assume that x° cars drive on a road per hour.
The total travel can be expressed as
T(x°) = X° t(x°) (eq.) 2.3.1
Where t(x) describes average time per car and has the number of 
vehicles as an argument. Further assume that x° cars per hour do 
not lead to any congestion, but when traffic increases beyond x°, 
congestion occurs and the average time per car increases. When 
traffic increases and approaches the road's maximum capacity, 
t(x) increases further. This means that
t'(x) = constant when x < x° 
and
t '(x ) > 0 and t''(x ) > 0 when x > x°
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The extra time that the marginal driver imposes on all drivers is 
found by differenciating T(x).
T'(x) = t(x) + x t7(x) (eq.) 2.3.2
The total marginal cost has two components. The first component 
is the time the marginal driver uses, and the second component is 
the extra time the marginal driver imposes on all other drivers. 
The optimal congestion toll equal the monetary value of the 
second component, x t7(x), for every level of traffic, x.
These equations can be converted to cost equations by using as a 
shadow price a constant value of time for the representative 
driver. It is then possible to write
q(x) = p t(x) (eq.) 2.3.3
Q 7(x) = p t(x) + p t'(x) (eq.) 2.3.4
where p is a constant shadow price of time, q(x) is average time 
costs per vehicle and Q'(x) is total marginal time costs. The 
congestion toll is the difference between the social time cost 
Q 7(x) and the private time cost of another trip. The congestion 
toll = p x t'(x) is represented in Illustration 1 by the vertical 
distance between Q 7(x) and q(x).
The demand side is incorporated in this example by 
determining and aggregating the drivers7 individual willingness 
to pay for their use of the road. The resulting inverse demand 
function can be written as
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Illustration 1. M arginal cost pricing.
B = D'1 (x) = B (x) (eq.) 2.3.6
where B'(x) <0. It is now possible to determine the optimal user 
fee or toll, given the demand. The drivers' private costs are 
given by q(x). The intersection between B(X) and q(x) where B(x2)
= q(x1) determines the traffic volume x1 that exists in the 
absence of congestion.
Illustration 1 also shows that the implementation of optimal 
road pricing would reduce the traffic volume from x1 to x2. The 
optimal toll at this traffic volume is 
Q(x2) - q(x2) = p x2 t' (x2)
This toll implies an economic net benefit to the society because 
of reduced travel times. A reduction of the traffic volume from
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x1 to x2 is a potential pareto improvement, because when drivers 
pay a toll corresponding the costs they impose on other drivers, 
they are forced to take into consideration the negative external 
effects they impose on others. In other words, the negative 
external effects are internalized by the toll.
The economic gain to society caused by optimal road pricing 
can be calculated in several ways. Two different ways of showing 
this is in illustration 1, and are based on Johansson and Mattson 
(1994). If one moves from the optimal solution with traffic level 
x2 to the nonoptimal level x1, the costs, represented by the area 
x2aexx, is larger than the benefits, represented by the smaller 
area x'abx1. This means that the welfare loss by not using an 
optimal toll is depicted by the area abe. An alternative is to 
investigate the areas which represents benefits and costs when 
road pricing is imposed. The costs is the area q1cdq2 in addition 
to x2cbx: and the benefits are the area x2abxx. The net benefits 
are therefore the area qxcdq2, that represents the gains in travel 
times minus the area cab, the loss of surplus because of 
suppressed trips. Thus there are gains to society from marginal 
cost road pricing, but drivers are worse off since the gain to 
travellers because of time savings are less than the tolls they 
have to pay (q2Q2cd) .
The public good caused by the congestion toll is reduced 
congestion in the short run and road improvements in the long 
run. This theoretical approach is a form of balanced budget 
incidence, which compares the incidence of the congestion toll,
30
and the resulting public good, reduced congestion. It is argued 
that the result is a net gain to society.
2.1.5 Road Pricing and Road Investments.
Roads represent a part of society's common resources. 
Everybody in the society benefits from roads, not only the 
drivers. The question that arises is who is going to pay for 
these resources. Roads have certain similarities with public 
goods, as earlier mentioned. A public good should be provided if 
it results in gains to society. For example, road improvements 
provide benefits if these improvements reduce the risks of 
accidents and wear and tear on cars.
When congestion occurs on roads, it represents a loss to 
society in form of longer travel time. These costs can be reduced 
by investments in road capacity. When drivers' private costs 
differ from the costs to society, and optimal congestion toll are 
implemented drivers will face the "right" user price, and their 
willingness to pay will be revealed. Once willingness to pay is 
known, critera for optimal investment in road improvements can be 
derived. According to theory the investment critera should be 
based on marginal not average costs.
Road planners have financial limits on their activities. The 
road projects are financed by a number of taxes and in the long- 
run budgets have to balance. There will be competition among 
profitable projects, and if the government chooses to invest in
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roads, other public investments must be delayed or reduced. When 
the road planners decide to build roads, they have to take the 
users' needs into consideration to determine an optimal stock of 
roads. This concerns the financing of the road projects and also 
how to collect the taxes. Which types of taxes are the better for 
the financing and who shall pay?
Thus, road pricing and road investments are closely linked 
especially when congestion exist. In the literature these two 
issues are also linked as the following discussion of Walters and 
Hau's work indicates.
2.1.6 The Putty model.
Optimal road investment strategy based on marginal cost road 
pricing can be illustrated with a simple model. Walters (1968) 
calls this model the Putty model, because it is assumed that the 
investments are divisible; the roads can be changed marginally. 
Also constant returns to scale in road building, maintenance and 
use of the road are assumed to hold. If constant returns to scale 
in road building and maintenance exists, increases in fixed costs 
yields a proportional increase in capacity. If constant returns 
to scale in the use of roads exists, travel time is constant when 
capacity and traffic are increased by the same percentage. 
Illustration 2 shows optimal traffic volume on a road given 
demand. The optimal user price is p*.
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Description:
Q' (x) : Marginal costs for one trip.
q(x): Generalized costs for one trip.
B : Demand
afc: Average fixed costs
ate: Average total costs
vc: Variable maintenance costs
x*: Optimal traffic
p*: Optimal total price for one trip.
Illustration 2. Ootimal investm ents.
Q'M
ate
qM
afc
.vc*
In this model, the user price consists of three different 
types of costs. First, the driver has to cover his own operating 
costs of using his/her car. Secondly, the user has to cover
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his/her share of the variable maintenance costs. Thirdly, the 
user of the road has to pay a tax that corrects for the negative 
external effects he/she imposes on other users.
The authorities' fixed costs consist of capital costs, fixed 
maintenance costs, operating costs and depreciation. The curve 
ate is the vertical sum of afc, vc and q{x). The figure 
illustrates an optimal situation in both the long-run and in the 
short-run. The size of the fixed costs, and therefore the size of 
the investments is exactly covered by the user fee. The user fee 
must in the case of optimal investments also cover the 
authorities variable maintenance costs. The optimal user fee for 
traffic level x* is therefore : 
optimal fee = vc* + p* - q{x)*.
The model's principle conclusion is that the users' 
willingness to pay determines road capacity. In the short run, 
the road capacity may not be optimal. If the capacity is too low, 
the optimal user fee implies profits for the authorities. This is 
a signal to marginally increase the investment and the fixed 
costs until these costs are exactly covered by the user fee (Hau 
1991).
The realism of the Putty model's assumptions are 
problematic. Investment in and expansion of road capacity is 
indivisible rather than incremental in nature. Road capacity can 
be increased by building more and wider lanes. In illustration 3, 
the impact of a road investment is represented by the shift from
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average cost curve q(x)b to q(x)a. The lanes be a certain width to 
carry traffic and the road has to be finished to be useful. Hau 
(1991) states that if a road with one lane in each direction is 
doubled in size, its capacity more than doubles. This indicates 
increasing returns to scale in road building, at least when one 
looks at an isolated road.
Another issue that makes optimal investment difficult is 
that roads to a large degree are non-reversible. At the time of 
investment, one to a certain extent can choose among different 
sized roads, but after this choice is mode, one must use the 
existing road. Uncertain forecasts about future traffic are 
therefore a problem for the authorities. Changes must be made by 
new investments. The existing road cannot easily be transformed 
without significant costs.
The Putty model also assumes constant demand. This 
assumption is unrealistic, because traffic varies significantly 
by time of day. Illustration 3 shows the demand in two periods 
where the demand is high (Bh) and low (B1) .
In illustration 3, the marginal cost curves are not drawn, 
but one can easily see that the traffic in the low traffic period 
produces no negative externalities. In the high traffic period, 
on the contrary, the external costs are large.
In this case, the implementation of perfect road pricing 
requires that users in the low traffic period not pay for the use 
of the road (If necessary they would pay the variable maintenance
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Illustration 3.
TkaiTIc level
costs only). The investment costs for increased road capacity are 
covered by the traffic that is responsible for this cost. If the 
high traffic periods are short, the revenues from the fees will 
be relatively low. An optimal investment strategy with revenue 
from marginal cost road pricing, will therefore have consequences 
for the speed at which roads are built. However, this capacity 
restriction is appropriate on economic grounds.
Illustration 3 portrayes another aspect of road investment. 
Investment in increased capacity will also result in increased 
road quality. Improved quality includes improvements to existing 
lanes, such as wider lanes, new lanes, and improvements to 
entrance and exit lanes. Increased road quality decreases average
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costs.
Increased road quality is an aspect that is embedded in new 
roads. Investments in better qualiy roads also increases 
capacity. In reality there exist small substitution possibilities 
between these two aspects of road investments. One could say that 
they were joint products as shown in the illustration. The 
illustration shows that the average costs are reduced after 
investments that increase capacity, and also improve road 
quality.
In the long run, improvements in the road network will cause 
both the marginal and the average cost curves in illustration 1 
to become flatter. If excessive congestion exists initially, the 
revenues from the congestion tolls are used for road 
improvements. When the road network is improved congestion will 
decrease and therefore the toll will decrease. If the demand for 
roads increases more slowly than road capacity over time drivers 
will benefit not only from lower tolls, but also from faster 
travel times. Another way of stating this is that when congestion 
is reduced the benefits of road pricing are also reduced and the 
need for large tolls decreases. Eventually the cost curves will 
become horizontal, and the optimal toll will be zero.
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2.1.7 Road investments in urban areas.
Road investments in urban areas have certain problems in 
addition to those of other road investments. A consequence of 
this, is that it becomes more difficult to determine if a road 
project is profitable.
Road investments in city areas are very expensive for a 
number of reasons. The land values are high in an urban area. The 
costs will therefore reduce the profitability of road projects. 
Because of lack of space, investments require expensive solutions 
such as bridges or tunnels. Another problem is the large 
variation in the demand for trips in city areas. Urban road are 
primarily intended to increase capacity not improve standards. 
Urban road standards are generally good, or at least difficult to 
improve. The benefits of investments during the low demand 
periods are therefore low. The main problem is that the capacity 
is too low during peak periods, and new capacity only has value 
during these periods. During the rest of the day this capacity is 
wasted.
The road network is a system of more or less effective 
bottlenecks. Intersections have a critical impact on driving 
times. If one removes one bottleneck the queue of cars may only 
be removed to the next bottleneck without achieving any reduction 
in travel times.
In urban areas public transportation is a good alternative 
to private cars. Public transportation routes are well developed
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compared to rural areas. Increasing the demand for buses and 
tramways will reduce the need for road investments. If one 
invests in roads, the use of cars may become attractive for 
people who earlier used public transportation. If these people 
change from public transport to private cars, the time savings 
are harder to calculate and the overcapacity outside the rush 
hours will become even larger. For this reason transportation 
planners in urban areas have also included the prices of public 
transportation when they try to decide on road investments.
Larsen (1989) argues that both public transportation and private 
cars should have differentiated tariffs.
Conclusion.
This section found theoretically optimal user fees for 
roads. These toll fees which vary with traffic level force 
drivers to take into consideration the external costs in the form 
of longer travel times they impose to other drivers. This user 
fee should be large when congestion is heavy, and small when 
congestion is light. As congestion toll revenues are used for 
road improvements, the benefits of tolls decrease and the toll 
will therefore decrease. Thus in the long-run drivers will 
benefit from smaller toll fees and faster travel times. However, 
the complexity of the urban transportation system must be 
recognized when road improvements are considered.
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2.2 Road pricing in practice.
The theoretical solutions to road pricing are discussed in 
the previous section. This section will investigate road pricing
in practice, and how close road pricing in practice has come to
the theoretical solutions. In this section, first the Singapore 
road pricing system is discussed then road pricing in the U.S.A. 
and in Oslo are rewieved.
2.2.1 The Singapore ALS.
Singapore's ALS was implemented in 1975. Since the Singapore
scheme was the first of its kind, a number of unanticipated side 
effects occurred and the scheme had to be modified to correct 
these problems. Initially drivers were charged a flat tariff for 
driving into the CBD (In Singapore called the Restricted Zone,
RZ,) during the morning rush hours, between 7:30 and 9:30 in the 
morning. However, severe congestion problems from 9:30 am to 
10:00 am caused the collection period to be extended to 10:15 am. 
Congestion in the evening became worse than in the morning and 
collection was extended once again to 4:30 to 6:30 in the 
afternoon. The tariffs have been changed a number of times, and 
currently the tariffs are as follows (Wilson, 1988) (In 1992 
dollars):
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Daily Monthly
Motorcycle 
Company cars 
Other cars
S$ 1 (USD 0.6)
S$ 6 (USD 3.5)
S$ 3 (USD 1.7)
S$ 20 (USD 11.6)
S$ 120 (USD 70.0)
S$ 60 (USD 35.0)
The ALS has achieved its objective. Holland and Watson 
(1977) found that the traffic decreased by 44 percent on average, 
and up to 73 percent during the morning rush. The average speed 
increased from 20 kilometers per hour (kph) to 33. In 1992, the 
average speed inside the RZ during rush hours was greater in 
Singapore than many other large cities (Brian, 1992).
Singapore 33 kph New York 10 kph
Stockholm 18 kph Bangkok 10 kph
London 12 kph Oslo 34 kph
However, it is not clear that benefits of this policy exceed its 
costs. Even if the Singapore ALS has improved the traffic and 
environmental situation inside the RZ, changes in travel behavior 
have caused traffic to increase greatly on peripheral streets. 
These charges may have offset the advantageous impacts inside the 
RZ and have caused Singapore to plan an ERP system. In response 
to the ALS, commuters in Singapore also shifted their travel mode 
from the auto to public transportation. Since not enough buses 
were available and planners did not designate enough bus lanes, 
public transportation travel times increased harming many 
commuters (Wilson 1986). The rescheduling of trips to before or 
after the collection period, also led to increased congestion and
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longer travel times and reduced welfare during these periods. 
Those who pay the toll are better off only if the time savings 
are large enough to compensate for the costs of the toll. All in 
all Wilson estimated that the ALS's effects on drivers were 
uncertain and that the toll might even have decreased their 
welfare.
An alternative to road pricing is to create disincentives to 
auto ownership. This technique has been used in Singapore, and 
Rex (1994) points out that ALS, together with other restraints on 
owners of vehicles, may reduce the welfare for Singapore's 
citizens in the future. Singapore has greatly increased the 
purchase price of automobiles to reduce the number of cars on the 
small and densely populated island to a relatively low level. For 
example, a Mazda 323 with automatic transmission costs USD 63,000 
in Singapore, about six times as much as in the U.S.A. This price 
reflects import duties and extremely high registration fees.
Since the cost of housing is about half that of a car, cars 
have high status in Singapore, and Rex concludes that the high 
cost of automobile ownership may cause highly skilled workers to 
migrate to other countries. A lower tariff rate for the ALS or 
ERP and especially lowering the purchase price of cars would 
increase their welfare and prevent people from migrating. While 
Singapore's policy leads to less congestion, road costs and 
pollution, the restrictions may be too severe. Rex argues that 
road congestion in Singapore is exaggerated and states that the 
city should be compared with large cities such as New York and
Tokyo and must be willing to tolerate a large amount of road 
congestion. An alternative is little restriction on autos, large 
investments in roads, and increased congestion and pollution. The 
economicly efficient solution, according to theory is that the 
drivers should pay for the full costs of their actions.
In Oslo the congestion is not as heavy as in Singapore and 
other large cities, and some economists argue (Ramjerdi 1994) 
that the congestion is so insignificant in Oslo that road pricing 
is unnecessary. A car is probably not the status symbol that it 
is in Singapore. The price of a brand new Mazda 323 is about 1/3 
that of a medium sized apartment. In this respect, the situation 
in Oslo is the opposite of the situation in Singapore. In 
addition, drivers in Oslo partly pay the costs of their use of 
the roads.
2.2.2 Road pricing experience in the U.S.A.
Tolls for roads and bridges became common in the U.S.A. 
during the 1950s and 60s, but even if the country started early 
with this method of financing roads, it did not develop in the 
same way as it developed in Europe. During the last two decades 
Europe and the industrialized parts of Asia have been the 
innovators of new systems of road financing and road pricing. In 
cities like New York and Los Angeles, which face even worse 
congestion problems than cities like Rome and London, congestion 
pricing is still virtually nonexistent.
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DeCorla (1994) states that even if there is a growing 
interest in congestion pricing because of its economic and 
environmental benefits, it is difficult for the U.S. public to 
accept this concept. The public views congestion pricing as 
another tax while only a few commercial road users value the time 
savings from reduced congestion more than they dread the toll 
costs. The general public has a difficult time understanding why 
they now have to pay for what they earlier got for free.
Other American writers (Schriener 1993) believe that the 
financing of toll-roads is a more important problem in the U.S.A. 
Private financing seems to be the most common form of financing 
for this type of road in the U.S.A. However, many states such as 
Arizona and Virginia do not allow public funds to be mingled with 
private funds. This policy has made funding of toll roads 
difficult. Schriener (1993) states that this is the reason why 
several planned toll-roads were never built in Arizona.
Despite financing problems, a number of large toll-road 
projects are planned in Orange County, California. One of them, 
the San Joaquin Transportation Corridor, a 15 mile toll-road, is 
financed through the sale of bonds. The bonds have been sold to 
private interests at interest rates of approximately 7.6 percent 
(Korman 1993) . A proposed fee of USD 2 per trip will make one of 
the most expensive toll roads in the U.S. Construction is 
expected to begin in 1995 on another 100 percent privately 
financed toll-road in Orange County. Tolls will be collected on 
this road for up to 35 years. An electronic road pricing system
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will be utilized to implement congestion pricing on two express 
lanes in each direction. This arrangement will hopefully reduce 
the large traffic jams which occur along this route (Korman 
1993) .
Orange County can provide an example for other areas that 
face similar problems (Hartje 1991). The design of the toll 
plazas is approximately the same as in Oslo, except that one will 
have a reversible High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lane in the 
median. For the system to work efficiently, AVI tags must be sold 
to as many vehicles as possible.
If the road projects in Orange County reduce congestion and 
improve environmental conditions, this example will probably be 
followed elsewhere the U.S.A. Maybe one will even see a toll ring 
in cities like New York and Los Angeles some time in future.
Conclusions.
The Singapore toll scheme is similar to the theoretical 
optimal scheme in that tolls are high during congested periods 
and no toll is chartered during congested periods. This scheme 
has reduced traffic during peak hours and improved environmental 
conditions, but increased traffic on untolled peripheral streets 
has resulted in increased congestion and environmental problems 
on those streets. The toll scheme also increased the demand for 
public transit, but since public transit capacity was limited 
travel times for many commuters increased. Thus the impact of the
45
toll scheme on economic welfare is unclear.
Large scale toll schemes like the one in Singapore are 
absent in the U.S.A, but plans are being developed for additional, 
toll roads. On current roads a flat toll is collected to finance 
the road improvements. True congestion pricing has not yet been 
implemented in the U.S.A.
2.3 The Oslo toll scheme.
The Oslo toll scheme's flat toll 24 hours a day is 
antitheoretical to the theoretical solution to road pricing. The 
purpose is mainly to collect revenues for further road 
investments, and in this respect the toll scheme has been a 
success. A toll system that is closer to optimal road pricing is 
investigated in chapter 3 and 4. However, this section 
investigates the impact of the toll ring on travel habits in the 
Oslo region during the first years of implementation. This 
section begins by discussing the Oslo region's traffic trends.
Then the toll ring's impact on the travel behavior of different 
groups of drivers is described.
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2.3.1 Oslo region traffic trends and the impact of the toll
ring on traffic volumes.
Nationwide, the total number of automobiles remained steady 
at slightly under 2 million from 1988 to 1992, but there were 
regional differences. The number of vehicles registered in the 
Oslo region decreased from 1987 to 1992 (Statistisk ordbok 1993), 
after a rapid increase in the early eighties, as can be seen in 
Figure 1.
Figure 1: Number of vehicles in the Oslo-region 
from 1988 to 1992
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The number of private cars decreased while buses and trucks 
increased in number from 1987. At the same time, the region's 
population increased by about 80 0 0 per year.
Even if the total number of cars decreased after 1987,
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traffic in the Oslo region did not decrease. Table 2.3.1 which 
reports the yearly count of cars on three roads leading into Oslo 
and one road inside the CBD indicates that total traffic on 
these routes increased from 1988 to 1992. Traffic decreased 
slightly at Vinterbru and Kringen. It seems peculiar that the 
traffic increased at Vinterbru from 1989 to 1990 when no 
improvements were made in road capacity. At Franzefoss where road 
capacity was increased, there was a large increase in traffic. 
However, despite the increased traffic significant time savings 
occurred on route E68. In general, traffic increased in this
Table 2.3.1: Average number, in 1,000, of vehicles per 24 hour in 
both directions. Reference: Statistical yearbook 
1989-1993.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
E6 Vinterbru 31,4 28, 6 30,1 30,7 30,3
E68 Franzefoss 23, 8 24, 5 24, 0 25, 0 27, 0
Rv4 Kringen 8,5 8,7 8,6 8,4 8,3
Oslo W.vn. 15, 7 16, 0 14, 6 14, 6 14,7
Total 79, 2
00oo 77,3 78,7 80,3
road, except from 1989 to 1990, when the toll ring was
implemented.
Traffic declined sharply on the one road located inside the
Oslo CBD from 1989 to 1990. This decline reflects a general
decrease in traffic inside the CBD which can be attributed to the 
toll ring and several road projects, among them, the Oslo tunnel,
that diverted traffic from the CBD.
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Since traffic increased from 1988 until 1992, at the same 
time as the number of cars decreased, those people who owned cars 
must have used them more often. This trend is verified by Vibe's 
study which found that automobile use in the Oslo region 
increased from 1985 to 1990 by 0.21 journeys per car per weekday. 
It is important to determine the causes of these changes.
Figure 2 indicates that the number of journeys increased 
from 1985 until 1988 and then began to decline. Although, the 
number of journeys per person per day in 1990 still exceeded the 
number in 1986. This decline coincides with the decline in 
total number of cars and the beginning of the general decline in 
the Norwegian economy. The reduction in the number of weekday 
journeys from 1989 to 1990 was 3.3 percent.
2.3.2 Change in travel habits on different groups of drivers.
Given the general developments in the Oslo region traffic, 
changes that occurred from 1989 to 1990 are investigated in more 
detail, in an attempt to determine the toll ring's impact on 
people's travel habits.
The following discussion is based on Hjorthol and Larsen's 
1991 mail survey of 40,000 randomly chosen people between 13 and 
75 years of age in the Oslo-region during the autumns of 1989 and 
1990. The survey consisted of a one day travel diary where 
the respondents answered questions about where they travelled to, 
from which places, why, and at which times of the day. This
Figure 2. 49
Journeys per person per day
Week days
1 . 8 5
1 . 7 5
in
c
V.=J
o
1 . 6 5
1 .5 5
1 . 4 5
1 3 8 61 3 8 5 1 3 8 8 1 3 8 3
Year
R e f e r e n c e :  V ib e  1 3 3 1 .
investigation covered every day of the week. To determine which 
social group the respondents belonged to, questions about income, 
work, age, sex, car ownership, transportation to and from work, 
and driver's license were included.
The survey conducted in 1990 was identical to the 1989 one 
except that questions about the toll ring were included. Fifty- 
three percent responded in 1989, and 75 percent of this group 
responded again in 1990. The responses for this group, of 
approximately 16,000, are reported, and their answers are 
summarized in the following pages.
The respondents took an average of 2.67 journeys per day in 
1989 and 2.37 in 1990. Table 2.3.2 shows that the decrease in
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journeys, 14.6 percent was the largest for discretionary journeys 
taken during leisure time. This group includes different kinds of 
shopping, private visits, errands and recreation.
Table 2.3.2: Number, and shares of journeys in 1989 and 1990, 
by the purposes of the journey. In percent. 
Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
1989
Purpose of Percent Number 
the journey per day
1990
Percent Number 
per day
Percentage
difference
Discretionary 55 1.45 53 1.24 -14.64
Commuters 37 0.99 39 0.92 - 6.8
In Business 8 0.21 8 0.21 - 0.9
Total 100 2.67 100 2 .37 -10.6
The reduction for commuters was 6.8 percent, and the reduction in 
business trips was only 0.9 percent. These figures may be a bit 
inaccurate, but the trend seems plausible because leisure trips 
are more flexible in frequency, timing and destination than the 
other two groups. If the toll fee is collected for each crossing, 
depending upon the amount of the fee, it should have a much 
larger impact on trip frequencies for discretionary trips than on 
the other groups.
Most of the journeys are taken by car, as a driver or as 
passengers, but table 2.3.3. reports other types of journeys as 
well. Both in absolute number and as a percentage, the journeys 
in cars decreased the most. In 1989, 1.77 journeys were made as a 
driver or passenger per person per day, but by 1990 this number 
was 1.52. These numbers are not consistent with the Vibe 1991 
investigation, even if Vibe's results are based on weekdays, and
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the Hjorthol study is based on the entire week; such 
inconsistencies indicate that the survey results may not
Table 2.3.3: Number of journeys 
Reference: Hjorthol
by mode 
1991.
transport.
1989
Way of Percent number 
transport per day
Percent
1990
number percentage 
per day difference
Walking/
bicycle 12 0.33 13 0.31 4.9
Public
transport 19 0.5 20 0.47 -6.3
Car, driver 56 1.49 55 1.31 11.7
Car,passenger 10 0 .28 9 0.21 24 .2
other 3 0.07 3 0.06 -5.3
Total 100 2 .67 100 2.37 -10.6
be robust. The Hjorthol study shows a decrease in journeys by 
car of almost 12 percent, and that fifty-five percent of all 
journeys were auto journeys. Journeys by public transportation 
also decreased slightly from 0.5 journeys per day in 1989 to 0.47 
in 1990, but the share of all journeys by public transportation 
increased by 1 percent. The share of journeys by bicycle or 
walking also increased slightly.
Because of these conflicting results, it is necessary to 
take a closer look at the reliability of the self reported data. 
It is possible that the decreases in all types of transportation 
are exaggerated. It is likely that people under reported their 
use of cars. The large differences between table 2.3.1 (based on 
actual counts) which shows only a 1 percent decrease and table
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2.3.3 which shows a more than 10 percent decrease support this 
conclusion. Also differences occur in the use of public 
transportation. In table 2.3.3, a decrease of 0.03 trips per day 
is reported, but at the same time according to the total revenue 
from ticket sales for public transportation, which carried people 
from the outlying regions to the center of the city, increased by 
3 percent. Part of this increase is probably due to price 
increases, but ridership also increased. Manual counts of public 
transportation use also support this conclusion.
2.3.3 Change in travel habits with respect to subscription and
residental location.
An important question is the impact of subscription cards on 
toll ring crossings. The implementation of the toll ring caused 
only an income effect for people who purchased subscriptions. The
cost of the subscription reduced their disposible income, but the
toll ring did not affect their cost for an additional trip.
People without subscriptions also experienced an income effect 
caused by the toll ring, but these users also experienced a 
substitution effect. The substitution effect will cause them to 
reduce the number of times they cross the toll ring and will, 
therefore, change their travel behavior.
Thus we should expect to observe a large reduction in trips that
cross the toll ring by those who do not purchase cards, but
little or no reduction by those who purchase cards. To answer
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this question, the entire group is divided into five sub-groups;
1 - persons without driver's licenses or cars,
2 - persons with a car who did not purchase a subscription
3 - persons with one car who did purchase a subscription
4 - persons with two or more cars who did not purchase a
subscription
5 - persons with two or more cars who purchased a subscription
for at least one car.
Table 2.3.4 presents the average reduction in the number of 
journeys by car per person per day for the different groups. 
Journeys by persons who did not own a car in 1989 are naturally 
not reported. The table shows that there was no difference in
Table 2.3.4: Reduction in number of car journeys by 
sub-group. Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Subgroups %-diff.89-90 %-decrease
1 car, no subscription 0.18 (12)
1 car, subscription 0.18 ( 8)
>1 car, no subscription 0.23 (11)
>1 car, subscription 0.21 ( 8)
the absolute reductions, and the number of car journeys for the 
different groups, but there was a difference in relative 
reduction. People with subscriptions decreased their journeys by 
a smaller percentage (8%) than people without subscriptions 
(12%). People with subscriptions, purchased them (or got them
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from their employer) because they used their cars intensively, 
and they reduced the number of trips much less than the others.
Table 2.3.5 reports the changes from autumn 1989 to autumn 
1990 with respect to where their journey originated and where 
their final destination was, and whether or not they crossed the 
toll ring.
Table 2.3.5: Share of journeys as a driver in each zone in the
Oslo region in 1989 and 1990. Reference: Hjorthol 1991.
Startzone Final
Oslo, inside 
toll ring
destination
Oslo west 
region
Oslo north 
region
Oslo south 
region
Oslo,inside
1989 43.1 54.4 55.7 48.2
1990 42.1 53 .4 52.5 44.5
Oslo, west
1989 54.6 64.1 71.3 56.1
1990 53.8 65.7 66.3 60.2
Oslo, north
1989 54.7 69.5 66.0 74.8
1990 52 .9 64 .7 66.4 71.3
Oslo, south
1989 47.9 55.7 73 .4 60.2
1990 45.0 62 .4 68.8 59.9
Within each region the changes are small, but between regions the 
changes are larger. The largest, decrease is for journeys from the 
regions outside the center of Oslo to destination inside the 
center city area. The long time period required to travel using 
public transportation from one subscription area to another, for 
example from the western region to the northern region reduces 
the percentage of these trips made by public transit. The fact
55
that one has to change commuter trains discourages many from 
using public transportation and causes them to use cars instead. 
The road improvements made after the toll ring was implemented 
reduced travel times for these journeys, and thus reinforced this 
tendency. A commuter train trip from the outlying regions to the 
CBD is fairly fast. This should imply an increase in journeys by 
public transportation, but this increase has been small, about 
two percent. The smallest reduction in auto travel occurred in 
the western region. This region had the smallest decrease in 
journeys with final destination in the CBD of all regions and 
journeys inside this region increased by 1.5 percent. It would 
seem reasonable that the western region was affected the least by 
the toll ring since it is by far the most affluent of the regions 
surrounding Oslo.
Table 2.3.6. reports the share of car journeys out of total 
journeys that crossed the toll ring before and after the toll 
ring was implemented, by region. The share of journeys by car 
decreased by 2.6 percent and this decrease is the smallest for 
the western region. Table 2.3.7 shows the decrease in
Table 2.3.6: Share of journeys that cross the cordon line 
by car, in percent. Reference: Solland 1991.
1989 1990 %-difference
West 20.8 20.5 -0.3
North 19.9 18.4 -1.5
South 14.3 13 .5 -0.8
Total: 55.0 52.4 - 2.6
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journeys by car is exactly offset by the increase in journeys by 
public transportation.
Table 2.3.7: Share of journeys that crosses the cordon line by 
public transportation, in percent.
Reference: Solland 1991.
1989 1990 %-difference
West 11.3 12.9 1.6
North 10.7 12.1 1.4
South 9.5 9.1 -0.4
Total: 31.5 34.1 2.6
One peculiar item in the last table is that both the 
journeys by public transportation and the journeys by car from 
the south decreased (table 2.3.6 and 2.3.8) . This region may have 
been affected more by the toll ring and the economic recession 
than the other regions.
Data on the share of journeys to work by car that crossed 
the toll ring, reported in table 2.3.8, indicates that this share 
was larger in 1990 than in 1989. This supports the hypothesis 
that leisure travel was affected most by the toll ring.
Table 2.3.8: Share of journeys to work by a car. 
Reference: Solland 1991.
1989 1990 %-difference
West 24.2 27.1 2 . 9
North 25 .3 28.2 2.9
South 18.6 18.0 -0.6
Total: 68.1 73 .3 5.2
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The investigations of people's travel habits before and 
after the introduction of the toll ring indicate a decline in 
traffic of about 5-10 percent, but a general decline in the 
number of cars in the Oslo region after 1987 (figure 1) and the 
proportion of vehicles registered outside the toll ring reported 
in table 2.3.9 indicates that the reduction may be overestimated. 
The decline in the number of cars from 19 87 altered the car 
ownership status of households in the Oslo region. The percentage 
of households without a car increased, and the percentage of 
households with one or two cars decreased. During the same 
period, the number of people employed in the Oslo region 
decreased5. This suggests that the reduction in traffic was not 
only because of the toll ring, but also because of a general 
recession in the Norwegian economy. Additional factors besides 
the toll ring that may have reduced automobile journeys include: 
-An approximately 16 percent increase in gasoline prices 
between autumn 1989 and autumn 1990 that caused a 1.2 
percent decline in gasoline sales (Bil og veistatistikk, 
1992) .
-Reductions in subsidies for car travel. The percentage of 
car households with a car who had a company car fell from 
7.5 in 1989 to 6.9 in 1990, and the percentage with access 
to free parking at work fell from 56.7 percent in 1989 to 
53.7 percent in 1990.
5 The unemployment rate for the Oslo region increased 
1,6% from 1989 to 1990.
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The reduction in car traffic from 1989 to 1990 was 3.3 
percent (Vibe 1991) to 14 percent (Hjorthol 1991). Many factors 
were responsible for this total change. This author estimate that 
the toll ring is responsible for about 3 percent of this 
decrease. This low estimate reflects actual traffic counts from
1988 to 19936 that are summed up in table 2.3.9 and the impact 
of the recession.
The counts in table 2.3.9 show a decline in traffic from
1989 to 1990 of 4.9 percent, but the decline had already started 
in 1988. From 1988 to 1989, the decrease in traffic was 1.3 
percent, and there is no reason to believe that this would not 
have continued from 1989 to 1990. A decrease in employment of 1,6 
percent from 1989 to 1990 implies that 11,000 fewer people needed 
to travel to and from work. If 2 0 percent of these normally 
crossed the toll ring, it would mean a decrease in traffic of 
about one percent. Since the increase in gasoline prices led to
Table 2.3.9: Average traffic that crossed the toll ring per
24 hour period from 1988 to 1993, seven days a week. 
Reference: See footnote 6.
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
West
North
South
83,009 
80,712 
55,781
83,164 
79,519 
53,979
80,851 
74,274 
50,923
80,716 
73,402 
50,522
81,294 
71,285 
50,828
82,584 
72,993 
51,448
Total 219,502 216,662 206,048 204,387 204,420 207,025
6 Reference: Kristiansen,K. Prosamrapport nr. 28, Oslo 1992, 
and also unpublished registration of vehicles crossing the toll 
ring 1991-1993 from A/S Fjellinjen.
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a decrease in gasoline sales of 1,2 percent, this change is 
responsible for another 0,5 percent decrease in traffic. This 
adds up to about 3.5 percent decrease, but since the economic 
recession has additional negative impacts on traffic, a three 
percent decrease caused by the toll ring is the final result.
A toll fee of NOK 11 could be considered fairly high, and 
one could have expected a larger impact on travel behavior. Yet, 
as a marginal cost, this fee should be compared with the costs of 
operating a car. Gasoline cost in October 1990 was more than NOK 
7 per liter, and given that journeys that cross the toll ring 
average 26 kilometers, the gasoline expenses exceeded the toll.
In addition, the cost of car ownership in Norway is among the 
highest in Europe. Given the high fixed car cost in Norway, a 
higher marginal cost can be justified for using the car. The cost 
of public transportation is also comparable to the costs of 
operating a car given public transportation's higher door-to-door 
time, that includes walking time, waiting time and transfers. 
These are reasons why the toll ring has not had a larger impact 
on travel behavior.
An alternative way of financing the road projects in the 
Oslo region would have been to increase the gasoline tax. Large 
costs would have been avoided because the toll stations would 
have been unnecessary. The gasoline tax increase could be 
structured so that it would collect sufficient revenue to finance 
the planned road improvements.
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The problem would be to set the borders for the increase in 
the tax. People would travel longer distances to purchase 
gasoline, and a number of gasoline stations would go bankrupt if 
the gasoline prices suddenly increased at some stations and not 
at others. This problem could be dealt with, if the gasoline tax 
increase were gradually decreased with distance from the city.
Due to this problem gasoline tax finance was never given serious 
consideration for the Oslo region road improvements.
Conclusion.
One of the objectives of the toll ring was to reduce total 
traffic and, especially, to reduce rush hour traffic. This 
objective was achieved during the first two years after the toll 
ring was implemented, but recent counts show that better roads in 
the future will only cause traffic to increase. This development 
has already begun, as the volume of traffic crossing the toll 
ring increased after 1992. These traffic increases are probably a 
product of changes in the Norwegian economy. Nineteen-nenety 
three was a relatively good year for Norway with low inflation 
and a reduction in the unemployment rate. This recovery will 
probably continue for the next few years. The recovery in 
combination with population increases in the Oslo region will 
have a significant impact on traffic. Traffic is estimated to 
reach its 1988 level by 1997 (Gylt 1991).
The total traffic level decreased in Oslo, and some of these 
changes can be directly linked to the toll ring. Journeys by
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vehicle during leisure time decreased more than journeys taken in 
conjunction with the driver's work. This is because leisure trips 
are more flexible in frequency and timing than commuter trips and 
business trips where the vehicle user is more or less dependent 
on their vehicles.
It is also determined that drivers with subscriptions 
changed their travel habits less than drivers without 
subscription, and that drivers from affluent parts of Oslo 
reduced their driving the least.
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CHAPTER 3
3.0 IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVE TARIFFS.
In this chapter the impact of differentiated tolls on the 
numbers of trips, on total revenue, and on the amount paid by 
different categories of drivers are investigated. Also those 
drivers who benefit from and are harmed by differential tolls are 
identified. These results are compared with those of the present 
flat tariff.
In this chapter, the short-run impacts of differentiated 
tolls are simulated. The long-run effects of changes in road 
pricing, the road or public transit improvements financed by toll 
revenues, and changes in population or incomes, are not treated.
A complete cost benefit analysis would include all these factors. 
Including these factors, alters the costs and benefits of the 
alternative road pricing systems by changing road and public 
transit cost curves and the demand for roads and public transit. 
These long-run effects are not within the scope of this thesis. 
However, the long-run effects of changes in road prices on the 
demand for roads is approximated by analyzing the impact of 
increasing the reaction coefficients used in this chapter.
The effects of the cordon toll ring on different income level 
groups and on land use and commercial traffic are also discussed.
3.1 The Economics behind the Calculations.
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The objective of differentiated tariffs is to utilize the 
existing road system in the most efficient manner. This results 
from private marginal costs that more closely reflecting social 
marginal costs. Investigations concerning attitudes indicate that 
drivers believe they are being treated unfairly if they have to 
pay the same amount of money to cross the toll ring during rush 
hours when road space is scarce, or at another time of the day 
when the traffic is very light (Simonsen 1991). One advantage of 
a high tariff during rush hours is that even a small decrease in 
traffic caused by this policy should result in a more even 
utilization of the road space over the day. The closer 
convergence of private and social costs is under a differentiated 
tariff than under a flat tariff is reflected in Illustration 4.
Illustration 4. Flat tariff case .
Costs
-Traffic level
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At point a with traffic level x3, social costs equal private 
costs with a flat tariff, but this is the only point where this 
occurs. When traffic exceeds level a, marginal social cost 
exceeds private marginal costs, and the toll is too small. If the 
traffic is lower than level a, private costs are larger than 
social costs and the toll is too large. Thus, differentiated 
tolls are more efficient than the present scheme if congestion as 
described in section 2.1.3 exists.
The optimal solution would be to set the toll at zero when 
the congestion was lower than traffic level x3, and then to 
increase it as traffic increased to reach a maximum when traffic 
equals x2 during the rush hours, and then to reduce it as traffic 
decreased. A problem with this solution is not knowing exactly 
when to adjust the prices. That is, knowing exactly where one is 
on the curve. In addition, drivers would not know in advance the 
cost of crossing the toll ring. In practice the tolls are varied 
infrequently. In Oslo only one small change has occurred. Nine 
months after the introduction of the toll ring the single 
crossing toll was increased by NOK 1. However, the flat tariff 
system has not been modified. While a system of differentiated 
tariffs is not marginal cost road pricing, it is closer to it 
than a flat tariff scheme. The impacts of a differentiated system 
are simulated in the remainder of this chapter.
3.2 Assumptions, definitions and the model.
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In this section the impacts of alternative pricing policies 
on traffic levels, and on different groups of drivers, and on 
total revenue are investigated.
It is assumed that all drivers undertake a marginal 
judgement every time they decide to take a journey, and that they 
pay each time they pass the toll ring. This is not true, because 
subscriptions allow drivers to pay the same amount whenever they 
cross the toll ring once or ten times per day. Subscriptions will 
be included in the analysis when it is likely that they will have 
an impact on the conclusions.
A potential traveler faces a number of choices. Whether to 
undertake the journey or not, at which time of the day to travel 
at, and what method of transportation to use. The pricing policy 
that was chosen for the Oslo toll ring affects these choices, and 
a different price policy will have different effects. For the 
analysis, drivers are divided into three types: discretionary 
trips, commuters and business trips.
-Discretionary trips: shopping, visits, errands and recreation. 
-Commuters: Trips made to and from work.
-Business trips: The group that take journeys to perform their
work such as all sorts of deliveries and 
services.
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The week is divided into;
-rush hours (7-10 a.m.); Weekdays, the evening rush is not
included.
-outside rush hours on weekdays.
-weekend; Saturday and Sunday.
Results are presented for four scenarios.
Scenario 1: situation before the implementation of the toll ring. 
Scenario 2: the present flat tariff scheme.
Scenario 3 & 4: differentiated tariffs.
In Table 3.2.1, the tariffs by time of day are presented 
for the four scenarios. A typical trip that crosses the toll ring 
is about 2 6 kilometers, and according to A/S Fjellinjen the 
average cost of a trip is NOK 15.
Table 3.2.1: Toll charges assumed in the following scenarios: 
(1) The initial situation , (2) Flat toll
(3) Differentiated (4) Differentiated.
1
Scenarios
2 3 4
Rush hours 0 11 NOK 20 NOK 30 NOK
Outside rush 0 11 NOK 7 NOK 5 NOK
Weekend 0 11 NOK 9 NOK 4 NOK
July 21, 1994: USD 1 = NOK 6.8.
The charges in scenario 3 and 4 are based on figures mentioned by 
that participants in recent debates concerning how large the
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future tolls should be. For example, future toll charges of 
between NOK 2 0 and 3 0 during the rush hours were suggested by 
Jean-Hansen (1991). The toll charges for the other time periods 
are more arbitrary, but experts have suggested that they be less 
than half the rush hour price.
Two parameters which affect the impacts and evaluation of a 
pricing scheme are the elasticity of demand and the portion of 
income spent on tariffs. The more elastic a group's demand, the 
greater the impact of a price change on their behavior and the 
larger their indirect burden. Since the price elasticity of 
demand for discretionary trips is much larger than for the other 
two types of trips, differentiated tariffs, compared with a flat 
tariff charge will have a larger impact on discretionary trips 
than the other two types of trips. Thus charges will reduce 
congestion for discretionary trips, but have little impact on 
congestion for the other two types of trips. Compared to a flat 
rate toll, differentiated tolls should collect a smaller share of 
the total toll revenue from discretionary drivers and a larger 
share from the other two groups. In addition, the larger the 
portion of the road users income that is spent on toll, the 
greater their direct burden as a percentage of income.
It is assumed that the change in traffic volume caused by a 
NOK 1 change in the tariffs based on the formulas below is 0.06 
for discretionary trips, and 0.025 for commuters and 0.01 for 
businesses (Ramjerdi 1993). These figures are called reaction
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coefficients and are assumed to hold for all drivers, with or 
without seasonal passes. This simplification is suggested by 
Jean-Hansen (1991).
The reaction coefficients are also chosen based the actual 
reductions in traffic caused by a similar toll scheme in Bergen 
that was implemented a few years earlier. Gasoline prices 
increased sligtly, and in approximately the same proportions in 
both Bergen and Oslo. This factor is included in the 
coefficients. When estimating the coefficients for the Oslo toll 
ring, Ramjerdi assumed that the coefficients were slightly 
smaller, because the Oslo toll ring is more sophisticated than 
the Bergen toll ring. In Bergen, the toll is collected manually 
and in Oslo most of the tolls are collected electronically. This 
reduction in time cost caused smaller reaction coefficients to be 
chosen.
The reaction coefficients appear in formulas (i) - (iii) below.
Discretionary trips:
(i) X (1,j)= X (1,1)-X(1,1)*0,06*P(j)/P (1)
Commuters:
(ii) X (2,j)= X(2,l)-X(2,l)*0,025*P(j)/P(l)
Business trips:
(iii) X (3,j)= X (3,1)-X(3,l)*0,01*P(j)/P(l) ,
where :i = 1-3 are 1: Discretionary trips
2: Commuters 
3: Business trips
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:j = scenarios 1-4.
:T(j)= toll in situation j. 
and P(j)= T(j)+15 = Price for one crossing in situation j.
In 1989, on average 216,662 cars per day crossed the toll 
ring. This includes an average of 108,390 on a Saturday or Sunday 
and 259,975 on a weekday. On weekdays, 24 percent crossed the 
ring during the rush hours between 7 and 10 a.m., and 76 percent 
outside rush hours8. This data, when combined with the shares 
for trip types from the 1991 mail survey (Hjorthol 1991), yields 
Table 3.2.2.
Table 3.2.2: Shares in percent by type of trip, days of the 
week, and time of day.
Weekdays Weekends
Purpose Rush No rush
Discretionary 10.37 41.18 73 .13
Commuting 38.58 21.68 12 .29
Business 51.05 37.15 14.59
Total 100 100 100
Assuming that the shares did not change, the shares from 1991 are 
applied to the actual counts from 1989 to determine the number of
8These are number of crossings from outside the CBD into the 
CBD only.
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trips by purpose and time period.
To determine if the reaction coefficients are reasonable, 
the predictions for 1991 based on the 1989 data are compared with 
the 1991 counts. Although it should take time for people to 
adjust to the toll ring, most adjustments should have been made 
by 1991. If these predictions for the flat tariff is accurate, it 
seems reasonable to use the same procedure to simulate the 
impacts of differentiated tariffs.
3.3 Base case simulation results.
In this section the base case simulated traffic levels for 
the four scenarios, by type of trip, and by time of day and week 
are presented. In section 3.5, a sensitivity analysis of the 
impact of alternative coefficient values on these results is 
conducted.
Calculated total traffic per year crossing the toll ring 
(104 Saturdays and Sundays, and 261 weekdays), is reported in 
Table 3.3.1.
The accuracy of these numbers can be determined by comparing the 
simulated and actual traffic volumes. The simulated total traffic 
per year is 74.5 million vehicles after a period of flat tariffs 
of NOK 11. In 1991, the actual traffic per year was 74.6 million 
vehicles. Thus, the simulated values closely approximate the 
actual values and the estimation procedure.appears to be
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Table 3.3.1: Total traffic per year crossing the toll ring 
by scenarios and trip type. Measured in 
million crossings per year. The numbers in 
brackets are percentages of the initial 
scenario.
Type 1
Scenario
2 3 4
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
31,2(100) 
18,9(100) 
29,0(100)
27,9(89.4) 
18,1(95.8) 
28,5 (98.3)
28,0(89.7) 
18,1(95.8) 
28,5 (98.3)
28,5(91.4)
18,0(95.2)
28,5(98.3)
Total: 79,1(100) 74,5 (94.2) 74,6(94.3) 75,0(94.8)
reliable. Thus, is assumed that the reaction coefficients are 
approximately correct, and even if the actual coefficients differ 
slightly from the coefficients used in the simulations this 
should not greatly alter the conclusions.
To further investgate what the results from a toll are 
between the different trip types, arc elasticities are useful.
One will then find which trip type that has the most elastic 
demand for road use. An arc elasticity can be written as 
(dX/(X1+X2)/2) / (dP/(P1+P2)/2) where
dX is change is traffic from scenario 1 to 2 
dP is the change in price (toll) from scenario 1 to 2
XI is the initial traffic level
X2 is the traffic level for scenario 2 
PI is the initial price (NOK 15)
P2 is the toll in scenario 2 (NOK 11)
The computed elasticities from scenario 1 to 2 are 0.13 for
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discretionary trips, 0.05 for commuters and 0.02 for businesses. 
This means that discretionary trips have the most elastic demand 
for road use and reduce their trips the most when tolls have to 
be paid, and businesses have the least elastic demand for trips 
and reduce their trips the least.
Table 3.3.1 indicates that the total number of vehicles that 
cross the toll ring increases when differentiated tariffs are 
substituted for the flat tariff. The flat tariff reduces traffic 
by almost 6 percent, and the most differentiated tariff reduces 
traffic by only approximately 1 percent. The major difference 
between flat and differentiated tariffs is their impact on 
discretionary trips which occur primarily outside the rush hours. 
The flat tariff reduces these trips by 10.6 percent but the most 
highly differentiated tariff reduces them by only 8.6 percent.
The impacts of differentiated tariffs by time of day and day 
of the week can also be determined. The simulated results for 
these time periods are reported in tables 3.3.2. through 3.3.4.
According to table 3.3.2, a flat tariff reduces rush hour 
traffic by 3.6 percent, and the differentiated tariffs cause 
a larger reduction.
Discretionary trips comprise only 10 percent of the total rush 
hour traffic. The present toll scheme reduces this type of trip 
by 10.4 percent and the most highly differentiated tariff reduces 
this type by, 18 percent. Commuters are less willing to reduce 
their auto trips significantly. People who use cars in their
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Table 3.3.2: Traffic by type on a typical weekday during the 
rush hours, measured in 1000 crossings. The 
numbers in brackets are percentages of the 
initial values.
Scenario
Type 1 2 3 4
Discretionary 6,4(100) 5,7(89,6) 5,5(86.0) 5, 2(82 . 0)
Commuters 24,0 (100) 22,9(95.7) 22,6(94.2) 22,2 (92.5)
Business 31,7 (100) 31,2 (98.3) 31,0(97.7) 30,8(97.0)
Total 62,2(100) 59,9(96.4) 59,1(95.1) 58,3(93.7)
work, the business category, reduced their rush hour trips by 
only 1.7 percent under the current flat tariff. The most highly 
differentiated tariff reduces this type of trip by only 3 
percent.
During off-peak periods on weekdays road space is no longer 
a scarce good, the differentiated tariffs are lower than the 
current flat tariff, and according to Table 3.3.3, the traffic 
volumes under the differentiated tariffs are greater than the 
volumes under the flat tariff. The reduction on weekdays during 
off-peak periods from the initial situation to the present scheme 
is .6 percent, much larger than the rush hour reductions. The 
source of this result is that discretionary trips comprise a 
larger share of total trips during off-peak hours than during the 
rush hours. With a differentiated tariff, compared to a flat 
tariff, off-peak traffic increases because more discretionary 
trips are taken. The changes for the other two trip types are 
small and reflect the inelastic demand for these trip types.
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Table 3.3.3: Traffic by type on a typical weekday
during off-peak hours, measured in 1000 
crossings. The numbers in brackets are the 
percentages of the initial values.
Type 1
Scenario
2 3 4
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
81,4(100) 
43,1(100) 
73,1(100)
72,9(89.6) 
41,2 (95.7) 
71,9(98.3)
74,2(91.5) 
41,5(96.3) 
72,1(98.5)
74,8(92.0) 
41,7(96.7) 
72,1(98.7)
Total 197,7(100) 185,8(94.0) 187,8(95.0) 188,7(95.5)
On the weekends, the vast majority of trips are 
discretionary. Seventy-three percent of all car use on the 
weekends is of this type. Table 3.3.4. reports the simulated 
weekend traffic.
Table 3.3.4: Traffic of each type on a weekend (Saturday or 
Sunday), measured in 10 0 0 crossings. The 
numbers in brackets are the percentages of the 
initial values.
Scenario
Type 1 2  3 4
Discretionary 79,2(100) 71,0(89.6) 71,6(90.4) 73,2(92.4)
Commuters 13,3(100) 12,7(95.7) 12,7(96.0) 12,8(96.8)
Business 15,8(100) 15,5(98.3) 15,5(98.4) 15,6(97.3)
Total 108,3(100) 99,2(91.6) 99,9(92.3) 101,7(93.9)
A flat tariff causes the largest reduction in weekend 
traffic. The reduction is 8.4 percent, and most of this 
reduction is discretionary trips. If the tariff is reduced to NOK 
4, as in scenario four, the traffic decreases by only 6.1 
percent. For weekends, this result is more efficient since
traffic volumes for all the weekend simulations are less than the 
capacity of the roads; therefore, the most efficient weekend 
tariff is zero.
In this section it has been assumed that subscriptions are 
not offered. Introducing subscriptions may alter the previous 
results. The most frequent road users purchase subscriptions, 
therefore those who make business and commuter trips are more 
likely to subscribe than those who make discretionary trips. The 
result of this reduction in average trip cost for commuters and 
business trips is that the average tariff by trip type in Table 
3.4.2 is more equal for the different types of trips. Thus the 
reductions in commuters and business trips will be smaller than 
those previously indicated and the impacts of the different 
pricing systems will be more similar than the following section 
indicates.
3.4 Total revenue and the distribution of the burden of the 
toll.
According to Table 3.4.1, the more differentiated the 
tariffs the lower the revenue from the toll ring. Of course, 
changing the tariffs could alter this result. Allowing 
subscription discounts will reduce all the numbers in Table 
3.4.1. and 3.4.2, but the overestimates should not alter the
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relationship between tariffs and revenues and the other 
conclusions. For example, the simulated total revenue in scenario 
two with the current flat tariff of NOK 11 per crossing, NOK 82 0 
million, exceeds the current revenue. Because of subscriptions 
the average payment per crossing was actually NOK 8.4 in 1991, 
which yielded total revenue of approximately NOK 63 0 million.
Table 3.4.1: Total revenue in million NOK by scenario 
and trip type.
Type 2
Scenario
3 4
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
307, 2 
199, 0 
313 , 8
(37.5)
(24.3)
(38.3)
229.8 (30.9)
205.9 (27.7) 
308,3 (41.4)
169, 6 
233 , 7 
323,2
(23.3) 
(32.2) 
(44.5)
Total 820, 0 (100) 744,0 (100) 726, 5 (100)
In scenario 3 and 4, a larger share of total revenue will be 
paid by businesses because these users need to use road capacity 
during the rush hours, and they are less willing to change their 
behavior. The opposite pattern is observed for discretionary 
trips. This groups share is reduced from 3 7.5 percent under the 
current system to 23.3 percent in scenario 4. Since commuters are 
only slightly more willing to alter their behavior than business 
travelers. This group also pays a larger share of total revenue 
under differentiated tariffs.
Table 3.4.2. summarizes the average payment by trip types 
and scenario. There are only small differences from scenario 2 to 
scenario 3 and 4 for businesses and commuters. For discretionary 
trips the change is, as expected, much larger.
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Table 3.4.2: Average tariffs by trip type and scenario.
Type 2
Scenario
3 4
Discretionary 11 8.21 5.95
Commuters 11 11.38 12 .98
Business 11 10.82 11.34
Differentiated tariffs benefit discretionary drivers. Their total 
payment decreases substantially as does their average price per 
crossing. Thus, the more highly differentiated the tariffs the 
smaller the impact on this trip type.
The other two groups pay more than under the present scheme and 
thus are harmed by differentiated tariffs. Differentiated tariffs 
redistribute income from commuters and business to discretionary 
drivers. This is probably a faire distribution. With 
differentiated tariffs, those who generate the largest external 
costs also pay the most, assuming that drivers pay the full 
tariff for each crossing. Allowing subscriptions, will cause the 
tariff for many discretionary trips to exceed that of many 
nondiscretionary trips. When subscriptions are allowed, a 
business vehicle that crosses the ring three times a day with an 
annual subscription, pays about half the price per crossing of a 
nonsubscription discretionary trip. This may be a low estimate 
since a business vehicle may cross many more times a day. To a 
degree, this also holds for commuters with subscriptions, who 
also use their cars for discretionary trips in the evenings. Also 
since subscriptions reduce the cost per trip, the reduction in
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trips will be smaller when subscriptions are allowed.
According to economic theory, differentiated tariffs should 
represent an improvement on the present flat tariff scheme, 
because higher tariffs during rush hours and lower tariffs at 
other times, are closer to optimal congestion pricing than the 
present scheme. According to the estimates, differentiated 
tariffs reduce traffic during the rush hours and increase traffic 
during off-peak periods. The only problem with differentiation is 
that it decreases total revenues. When the toll ring was first 
implemented, flat tariffs probably alleviated implementation 
problems. Given current technology and subscription levels, the 
transition to differentiated tariffs would not be difficult.
3.5 Sensitivity analysis.
The results of the simulations depend on the reaction 
coefficients. In this section, the impacts of varying the 
coefficients will be investigated for three cases. Case 1 
investigates whether small changes in the reaction coefficients 
have a signigicant impact on the results. Cases 2 and 3 attemt to 
capture long-run impacts of changes in road prices on the demand 
for roads. In case 2 all coefficients are increased, and in case 
3 the rush hour coefficients are increased, and all the other 
coefficients are decreased. The cases yield results that are 
close to the actual traffic volumes.
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In case 1 it is assumed that the reaction coefficients 
decrease with traffic volume. To investigate this possibility the 
rush hour coefficients for the differentiated pricing scenarios 3 
and 4 are increased slightly with the degree of differentiation, 
and the nonrush coefficients including the weekend coefficients 
are reduced slightly with the degree of differentiation for 
discretionary and commuters trips. Because of the small reaction 
coefficient for business trips these are kept constant. The 
changes in the coefficients are proportional to the difference 
between the differentiated tariffs and the flat tariff of 
scenario 2. This is called case 1.
The decision not to alter the coefficients for scenario 2 is 
based on the accuracy of the base case simulated traffic levels 
for scenario 2. The original reactions coefficients for scenario 
2 and the revised reaction coefficients for scenario 3 and 4 are 
reported in Table 3.5.1.
Table 3.5.1: Case 1 reaction coefficients.
Type
Rush hours
Scenario 
2 3 4
Non rush/weekend 
2 3 4
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
.060 
. 025 . 
. 010
065 .070 
026 .027 
010 .010
.060 
. 025 
. 010
.0575 .055 
.0225 .002 
.0100 .010
When one compares the results in Table 3 .5.2. with the
previous ones (tables 3 .3.2-3.3.4), no large changes are
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observed. Discretionary trips decrease during the rush hours and 
increase outside the rush hours and on the weekend. The pattern 
is observed for commuters, but to a lesser degree. The total 
number of crossings increases, but only by 400,000 in scanario 3, 
and by less than 300,000 in scenario 4. These changes cause small 
and insignificant changes in total revenues and in the shares of 
total revenue paid by the different trip types.
Table 3.5.2. Case 1 results: Traffic in each group per day by 
times of the week for scenario 3 and 4.
Rush hours Outside rush Weekend
Scenario 3 4 3 4 3 4
Discretionary 5,5 5,1 74,5 75,4 72, 0 73,7
Commuters 22, 6 22, 1 41,7 42,0 12, 8 13, 0
Business 31,0 30,8 72,1 72,1 15, 5 15, 6
Total 59, 0 58, 0 188,4 189,5 100,3 102,3
The original estimates closely parallel the results for a 
flat tariff in the short-run, two to three years, and the 
estimates for the differentiated tariffs may be quite accurate as 
well9. When the reaction coefficients were varied, the resulting 
changes were inconsequential. These changes in the coefficients 
seem logical and are suggested by several writers 
(Ramjerdi,1994).
9 A sensitivity analysis could be for larger and smaller 
reaction coefficients, but because of the conducted small impacts 
found in this section, these analyses are not conducted.
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Jean-Hansen (1991) suggests increasing all coefficients to 
attempt to capture the long-run impacts of changes in road prices 
on the demand for roads. It is important to note that other long- 
run changes are implicitly included in this suggestion. Thus in 
case 2, all coefficients were increased by 50 percent for all 
scenarios and for all times the day and days of the week. The 
results of these simulations, reported in Table 3.5.3, indicate 
that the number of cars crossing the toll ring changes slightly, 
while revenue is quite stable. A problem with this approach is 
that it underestimates the number of vehicles that actually 
crossed the Oslo toll ring. The number of vehicles that crossed 
the ring was lowest in 1991-1992 and increased the following 
years. Thus increasing the coefficients by 50 percent to capture 
long-run adjustments does not appear to be appropriate.
Table 3.5.3: Case 2: results when the coefficients are 50 percent
higher.
Total traffic in million cars by scenarios
2 3 4
All purposes 72,3 73,0 73,0
Total revenue in million NOK by scenarios. 
2 3 4
All purposes 795,1 729,2 721, 0
To more closely approximate the actual crossings, the above 
procedure was modified by increasing the rush hour coefficients
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by 50 percent, and decreasing the off-peak coefficients by 50 
percent except for the business group's coefficient which was not 
changed. These changes, referred to as case 3, will cause a 
larger reduction in discretionary trips during the rush hours, 
and an increase in off-peak trips compared to the previous 
simulations.
The simulation results for case 3 are reported in Table 
3.5.4. These results closely parallel the actual traffic levels 
during the first five years of the toll ring. The number of cars 
crossing the toll ring is estimated to be about 77 million in 
1994, and this simulation yields a slightly lower estimate. With 
differentiated tariffs, the number of cars decreases slightly and 
so does revenue.
Table 3.5.4. Case 3 results.
Total traffic in million 
2
cars by scenario. 
3 4
All purposes 76,3 76,3 76, 1
Revenue by scenario and trip type.
Discretionary
Commuters
Business
2
323,2(38,5)
200,6(23.9)
315,1(37.5)
3
239,3(31.8) 
203,7(27.1) 
309,1(41,1)
4
168,8(23.0) 
226,2(30.8) 
339,1(46.2
Total 838,8(100) 752,1 (100) 734,0(100)
As the tariff differentiation increases these changes in the 
reaction coefficients cause the business trip type to pay more
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and discretionary and commuters trip type to pay less than was 
the case for the original estimates found in Table 3.4.1.
3.6. Distributional effects.
The more differentiated the tariffs, the larger the portion 
of the total revenue paid by high income groups. The higher 
income groups are willing to pay more because they assign higher 
values to the trips and receive greater benefits from reduced 
travel times. For discretionary trips, and to a certain degree 
also among commuters, the value of time increases with disposable 
income. In general, wealthier individuals are willing to pay more 
to use the roads. Thus, when the toll ring was implemented, low 
income groups reduced their trips more and payed a smaller share 
of the total revenue than high income groups10.
The employers of those with high incomes more often than 
those of others pay their toll ring expenses. It might seem that 
this is unfair to people with lower incomes, but covering toll 
ring costs is simply another form of compensation, which in the 
absence of the toll ring would take some other form. However, 
those with higher incomes are still charged for their use of the 
roads.
10 A low income family in is Norway defined as a family 
with a total income of NOK 100,000 (about USD 14,000) per year, 
and a high income family has an income above NOK 250,000 (about 
USD 3 6,000) per year.
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Another generalization is that the more important the journey, 
the more a person is willing to pay. Therefore, the number of 
business trips which cross the toll ring was only slightly 
reduced by the toll ring. However business will benefit from 
reduced travel time. Thus the net impact on businesses which will 
ultimately fall on factor owners or consumers is uncertain.
Low income motorists are more likely to switch their travel 
times when a differentiated toll is charged. This group also is 
more likely to switch their travel mode from the auto to public 
transit. The more differentiated the tariffs, the more likely low 
income individuals are to alter their travel times and modes.
This group will be harmed unless alternative transport is 
improved.
Public transportation is the best alternative to the car, 
but it does not seem to be a very good alternative for most 
people. Figure 3 illustrates trends in the use of the metro and 
the tramway from 1988 to 1989.
The figure shows that the traffic on the metro decreased steadily 
after 1988 even though the toll ring was implemented in 1990. The 
metro brings commuters from the near suburbs to the central city. 
The number of passengers using the tramway increased during this 
period. The tramway primarily serves the center city. This 
increase may be the result of reduced traffic in the CBD due to 
an increase in the number of one way streets and closed streets 
in the CBD. At the same time, total commuter train ticket sales
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increased slightly from 1989 to 199011. This trend continued in 
1991-1992. More frequent commuter trains in the Oslo region 
should increase the number of passengers in the future as transit 
ridership is more responsive to service improvements than any 
other factor (Oslo sporveier 1991). Also, reductions in the high 
transit fares, should also increase transit ridership12.
Even if the number of people who transferred from cars to 
public transportation has not been very large, those who used 
public transportation before the implementation of the toll ring 
benefited from more frequent departures and fewer required
11 The total ticket sales increased by 2-3 percent during 
this period (Statistical Yearbook 1992).
12 The fare for a trip from the near suburbs or inside the 
city was NOK 14 (about USD 2) in 1992.
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transfers to other trains. Bus riders have also benefited from 
improved service. For example, the number of buses in the Oslo 
region increased by 1200 (18%) from 1989 to 1992.
As we have seen, the road user charges benefit higher income 
groups because the value they assign to the time saved exceeds 
their toll expenditures. Low income groups who do not own cars, 
also benefit from public transportation improvements financed by 
toll revenues. It is the middle income car owners who are most 
likely to be harmed by the toll ring. The value that they assign 
to the time served, is likely to be less than their toll 
expenditures and they are more likely to change their travel 
habits.
3.7 Effects on land use and commercial traffic.
The current toll ring has hardly affected the businesses use 
of vehicles. The previous simulations indicate that 
differentiated tariffs have a similar small impact. Although in 
the long-run the toll ring could alter business locations, no 
clear evidence of such changes has been observed to date in the 
Oslo region. However, earlier observations from Singapore 
(Holland 197 8) suggest that a small reduction in trade occurred 
following the introduction of the Area Licensing Scheme. But 
there were no significant locational changes, and a general 
recession could have caused the reduction in trade. In Oslo, the 
opposite effect might have occurred because shops that previously
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were located on busy streets are now in an area where only 
pedestrians and business vehicles are allowed. This may have made 
these stores more accessable for both pedestrians and business 
vehicles. In addition, more parking lots were built inside and on 
the outskirts of the CBD.
Some industries will probably change their location in the 
long run because of the toll ring. In London supermarkets and 
industrial activities that generate heavy traffic tended to move 
outside the priced area, and hotels, quality shopping, and some 
higher value residential uses, moved inside (The chartered 
Institute of Transport, 1992). Since this pattern of land use 
already exists in Oslo, the toll ring will probably have only a 
small impact on land use. Commercial traffic, such as trucks 
carrying heavy and light goods, and taxies that have to pass the 
toll ring several times a day, will find it advantageous to buy 
seasonal passes. However, the benefits of the toll ring for 
these drivers, which include time savings, more space for loading 
and unloading, and reduced congestion, may exceed their toll 
cost. One indicator of this result is that taxable income in the 
Oslo region increased from 1989 to 1992 even though the Norwegian 
economy experienced a recession during this period.
3.8 Environmental impacts
The toll ring has reduced environmental problems caused by 
air and noise pollution from vehicles. This is mainly because of
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tunnels that divert traffic away from high density residental 
areas. An investigation coordinated by NILU (1992) measured air 
and noise pollution in a residental area before and after the 
construction of a tunnel. The residents clearly benefited from 
reductions in air and noise pollution.
Total reduction of pollution is a goal in Norway, and a 
strongly differentiated road pricing tariff scheme would have 
reduced pollution. The Public Pollution Control (SFT) has 
estimated that the pollution is five times greater in a queue or 
a standstill than in a situation with smoothly flowing traffic. 
Therefore, the society would benefit from differentiated tariffs 
which reduces car queues during the rush hours even if the 
overall traffic level increased.
3.9 Conclusions.
Discretionary trips are affected the most by the toll ring, 
and business trips are the least affected in the short-run. Thus, 
when differentiated tariffs are imposed, discretionary trips 
during the rush hours decrease the most, and this group pays the 
smallest share of total revenue. Discretionary trips pay only 24 
percent of the total revenue while the business group pays almost 
45 percent. Under the present flat tariff scheme these two groups 
pay about the same amount.
In the sensitivity analysis, it was first assumed that as 
the tariffs became more differentiated, the rush hour reaction
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coefficients increased, and the coefficients for the other time 
periods decreased. These changes in the coefficients caused only 
small changes in traffic patterns. Then all the coefficients were 
increased by 50 percent in an attempt to estimate long-run 
traffic volumes and total revenue. However, these estimates were 
too low to be plausible. Finally, to estimate the long-run demand 
for roads, the rush hour coefficients were increased by 50 
percent and the coefficients for the other time periods were 
decreased by 50 percent. This simulation provided estimates that 
were by the end of 1994 only slightly low for scenario 2, and can 
probably be used as well to provide reasonable estimates for 
differentiated tariffs. Differentiated tariffs will also have an 
impact on time savings as discussed in the next section.
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0. WELFARE IMPACTS.
Based on the results from chapter 3, the welfare 
implications of the scenarios 2, 3 and 4 pricing schemes are 
investigated in this chapter. Three components will be combined 
to determine the most efficient pricing scheme; revenue derived 
from the toll ring, lost surplus due to suppressed trips, and 
gains from reduced travel times. Simulated revenue from the toll 
ring was determined in chapter 3 for scenarios 2 through 4. In 
this chapter the lost surplus due to suppressed trips and the 
gains from reduced travel times will be calculated for these 
three scenarios. These three components will be used to determine 
the most efficient pricing scheme.
4.1.1 Loss of surplus
The following calculations are based on 1989 data because 
the reductions in traffic due to the toll ring are known, and the 
previous simulated traffic volumes for the flat tariff were very- 
similar to the actual figures. In 1989, before the toll ring was 
implemented, 79.1 million vehicles crossed the cordon line. Of 
these crossings 16.3 million were during the rush hours, 51.5 
million were on weekdays during off-peak hours, and 11.3 million
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were on the weekends.
The average tariff to cross the cordon line for all drivers, 
regardless of time of day, was NOK 8.4, but NOK 11 is used in 
these calculations to provide a better comparison with the 
differentiated tariff scenarios. In table 4.1.1 the loss of 
surplus is calculated for the different scenarios, for rush 
hours, weekdays during off-peak hours, and weekends13.
Table 4.1.1: Loss of surplus by scenarios and time of 
day. Numbers in million NOK.
Peak Off-peak Weekend Total
Scenario 2: 6,63 34,10 10,44 51,17
Scenario 3: 8,10 24,23 8,74 41,07
Scenario 4: 9,90 22,72 6,67 39,29
The loss from suppressed trips is the largest for scenario 2 due 
to a large reduction in off-peak weekday trips caused by the flat 
tariff of NOK 11. Congestion is low during this period, and it is 
not efficient to price drivers off the road. Scenario three and 
four are both more efficient than scenario 2. High tariffs during 
rush hours cause a small loss of surplus because the demand for 
trips at this time is the least elastic. Lower tariffs in the 
other periods reduce the loss from suppressed trips and cause 
drivers to use the roads when there is little or no congestion.
13 NOK 11 is used as the price per crossing in scenario 2.
The weighted average price per crossing is 9.97 for scenario 3, 
and 9.69 for scenario 4.
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In illustration 1, the lost surplus is represented by the 
area abd. This area is largest for scenario 2 and is reduced as 
prices become more differentiated. A more differentiated tariff 
reduce the lost surplus because drivers pay a toll that is closer 
to social marginal costs. This requires a higher toll during the 
rush hours and a smaller toll during hours with little or no 
congestion.
4.1.2 Time savings.
The time savings on 17 routes to and from the center of Oslo
from 1989 to 1992 are measured during the rush hours, 3 hours in
the morning and 2 hours in the afternoon. The average speed
increased by only 1 kilometers per hour14, and time saving
averaged 1.32 minutes per trip (Prosamrapport nr. 29). The speeds 
did not increase substantially because of extensive road 
construction. This construction has caused the speeds to be lower 
than what can be expected in the future. The small speed increase 
that is measured during the rush hours is used to calculate the 
value of the time savings for the rush hours. Half the time 
savings are assumed to occur on weekdays during off-peak hours 
and on the weekends. This estimate is based on advice from one of 
the planners from the Oslo Roadbuilding Association.
This savings is represented by the area q2cdq2 in
14 The average speed was 33,8 kilometers per hour 
(approximately 22 miles per hour) on the average trip of 2 6 
kilometers (approximately 16 miles).
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Illustration 1. The actual time savings can be compared with 
scenario 3 where the simulated reductions in traffic are assumed 
to yield time savings of 3 minutes during the rush hours and 0.5 
minutes on weekdays during off-peak hours and on weekends.
In scenario 4, the simulated reductions in traffic are assumed to 
yield time savings of 3.5 minutes during the rush hours, and the 
same time savings as in scenario 3 on weekdays during off-peak 
hours and on weekends. These numbers are assumptions and may not 
be accurate, but they are based on the principle that when the 
congestion is heavy, traffic reductions will yield large time 
savings, and when congestion is light or insignificant, traffic 
reductions will yield small time savings.
To estimate total time savings, the traffic that crosses the 
cordon line in the three scenarios is multiplied by the time 
savings and the average number of passengers per car that crosses 
the toll ring, 1.2,(Vibe, 1991), and transformed into saved 
hours.
Time is valued differently by each group. Time is likely to 
be more valuable for a delivery man who has to visit a customer 
before a certain time than for a private visiter late at night. 
There are also differences in the value of time savings between 
countries. Cole 1990 estimates the value of time per hour per 
person for Canadians as follows:
-Discretionary: NOK 118 approximately USD 17 
-Commuters : NOK 124 approximately USD 18
-Business : NOK 152 approximately USD 22
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These estimates are much higher than those for the U.S.A, 
Japan, and Norway for discretionary and commuters' trips. 
Estimates for commuters in the U.S.A, measured in current dollars 
and expressed in 1990 dollars are USD 8.9 (Chui, M 1987), and for 
Japan about USD 5.7 (Edwards 1983). The values of time for Norway 
as calculated in Kjorekostnadsboka 1991 (The Driving Cost 
Handbook 1991) are as follows:
-Discretionary: NOK 19.0 approximately USD 2.7
-Commuters : NOK 33.8 approximately USD 4.8
-Business : NOK 128.5 approximately USD 18.4
The values for the time savings are reported in Table 4.1.2
for different trip types for scenario 2 through 4. The table 
shows that the toll ring and the road improvements yield 
substantial time savings even for small increases in speeds.
Among the trip types, it is the business trips that have the 
largest time savings. This is because the value of time is larger 
for this group, and because they make over half their trips 
during the rush hours. The time savings are larger the more 
differentiated the tariffs. The most substantial difference 
between the scenarios, is for business trips during the rush 
hours. A doubling of time savings from scenario 2 to scenario 3 
more than doubles the value of the time savings for business 
travelers. Since the business group has the least elastic demand 
for road use, a small reduction is traffic during rush hours
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yields a large time savings for them.
Table 4.1.2: Calculations of time savings by type of trip for 
days of the week and time of day.
Measured in million NOK.
2
Scenarios
3 4
Peak hours:
Discretionary 0,8 1,8 2,1
Commuters 5,4 12,1 14, 0
Business 27, 2 61, 0 70,3
Total : 33,4 
Off-peak hours:
74,9 86,3
Discretionary 5, 0 3,8 3,9
Commuters 4,7 3,6 3,6
Business 30,5 23, 6 23, 5
Total 40, 8 31,0 31,0
Weekend:
Discretionary 1,9 1,5 1, 47
Commuters 0, 6 0,4 0,4
Business 2,5 1,9 2, 0
Total : 5,0 6,8 3,9
Total all
scenarios: 78, 0 112, 8 121,2
The other periods exhibit the opposite pattern. Since the 
traffic level is lighter during off-peak hours on weekdays and on 
weekends, the value of time savings are reduced with increasing 
price differentiation, but only by a small amount. These results 
can be attributed to light initial traffic levels that are only 
slightly increased by the lower tariff.
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Time delays connected with the collection of money impose 
costs on the drivers who use the coin automats and the manual 
lanes. The additional time required in these lanes averages 15 
seconds. On February 1, 1992, 3 9.8 percent used these lanes, and 
the share for each trip type was different. Of the total 74.5 
million trips that crossed the toll ring, 29.1 million were 
discretionary trips (72 percent manual/coin) 17.8 million 
commuter trips (31 percent manual/coin) and 27.5 million business 
trips (11 percent manual/coin). Since the total number of 
crossings differs little in each scenario, the cost of the 
delays, reported in Table 4.1.3, is approximately the same for 
each scenario.
Table 4.1.3: Calculations of time delay by type of trip by day
of the week and by time of day. Measured in million 
NOK.
Peak
hours
Off-
peak
Week­
end
All
week
Discretionary: 0, 111 1, 365 0, 516 2,0
Commuters : 0, 317 0, 550 0, 066 0,9
Business : 0, 566 1,272 0, 106 1,9
Total 0, 995 3, 187 0, 689 4,9
Most of the costs of delay occur during off-peak hours, and 
discretionary and business trips carry most of the burden. These 
costs are a small share of the value of time savings.
4.1.2 Comparison between the scenarios.
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Based on the profit and loss account for A/S Fjellinjen, 
the toll ring has capital costs of NOK 26 million per year and 
annual operating costs of NOK 7 0 million. The costs and benefits 
of the toll ring are summarized in table 4.1.4.
Table 4.1.4: Summary of the evaluation of the scenarios, 
measured in million NOK.
Lost
surplus
Time
savings
Total
Scenario 2 : 51,2 78, 0 26,8
Scenario 3 : 41,1 112,8 71,7
Scenario 4 : 39,3 121, 2 81, 9
Collection costs:
Costs of delays at toll booths -4, 9
Capital costs -26, 0
Operating costs -70, 0
Total -100 / 9
Table 4.1.4 indicates that the scenarios with differentiated 
tolls produce the best results. When scenario- 2 and 4 are 
compared graphically in Illustration 1, the area qxcdq2 is 
approximately 1.5 times larger than the area abc for scenario 2, 
while in scenario 4 the first area is 3.1 times larger than the 
second. This means that scenario 4 yields larger benefits to 
society than the present pricing scheme. The same holds for 
scenario 3, but to a less degree. In scenario 2 the lost surplus 
and the value of time savings are equal during off-peak hours on
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weekdays and on weekends. For the same time periods, the time 
savings are larger than the lost surplus for scenario 3 and 4. 
Also, in scenario 2 only 42 percent of the toll revenue is 
collected from the rush hour traffic that makes investments in 
increased road capacity necessary. In comparison, this percentage 
for scenario 4 is 71 percent.
The present scheme was chosen because collection of revenue 
is the most important objective of the Oslo toll ring. From Tble 
3.4.1, scenario 3 yields 9 percent less revenue than scenario 2, 
and scenario 4, 11 percent less than scenario 2. When one takes 
lost surplus, time savings and collection costs into 
consideration, these numbers shrink to 4.2 and 5.2 percent 
respectively. The differences between the scenarios are listed in 
Table 4.1.5.
Table 4.1.5: Comparison between the scenarios.
Revenue Lost
surplus
Time
savings
Collection
costs Total
Scenario 2: 820, 0 51,2 78, 0 100,9 745,9
Scenario 3 : 744, 0 41,1 112, 8 100, 9 714,8
Scenario 4: 726, 5 39,3 121,2 100,9 707, 5
The scenario with the strongest form of differentiation is 
preferable from society's point of view. This system yields the 
least lost surplus, and time savings which are closer to those of 
optimal road pricing. Revenue decreases, but the reductions in 
traffic during the rush hours would also reduce the demand for
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road investments.
From these results, the present flat tariff toll scheme is 
the least efficient and the strongest differentiated toll scheme 
is the most efficient. In this analysis, lost surplus and 
collection costs are real costs to society, and time savings are 
real gains. Table 4.1.5 shows that when differentiation 
increases, the real costs to society represented by lost surplus 
decreases, and real gains to society represented by time savings, 
increases. This means once again that the stronger the 
differentiation of tariffs by time of day, the larger the gains 
to society. The revenue decreases with stronger differentiation, 
but revenue is not a real cost to society, just a transfer from 
motorists to the government.
Another way of showing the differences between the scenarios 
is to compute the welfare cost per NOK of revenue for each 
scenario. The average welfare costs is computed in Table 4.1.6, 
and supports the other results in this chapter. The most
Table 4.1.6: Average welfare cost for each scenario.
2
Scenario
3 4
Average
welfare
cost 0.09 0.04 0.03
differentiated scenario yields the least welfare costs, and a 
larger gain to society compared to the present flat rate toll 
scheme.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS.
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This thesis establishes that it is possible to design a toll 
system that is more efficient than the present flat rate toll 
ring. To achieve this, a system that is closer to the 
theoretically optimal road pricing system should be employed. A 
differentiated toll system is more efficient because suppressed 
trips are reduced. Reduced rush hour traffic volumes results in 
travel time reductions. The simulated system of differentiated 
tariffs yields less revenue than the flat rate tariff, but better 
use of the road network over the day, that is, reduced traffic 
during the rush hours when congestion occurs and increased 
traffic on weekdays during off-peak hours and on weekends, when 
congestion is not present, reduces the need for increased road 
capacity.
The calculations indicate that improvements in the present 
Oslo pricing scheme will yield net benefits to society. According 
to the simulated implementation of differentiated tariffs, moving 
from scenario 2 to 4 reduces social costs in the Oslo region by 
about NOK 55 million per year. These numbers may not be exact, 
but the conclusion is clear; the present flat tariff scheme can 
easily be improved by introducing differentiated tariffs.
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1Appendix 1
EXPLANATIONS TO TABLES IN CHAPTER 3 AND 4:
Tables. chapter 3:
Table 3.3.1 is a summation of tables 3.3.2 through 3.3.4.
Table 3.3.2. Example.
The initial value for rush hours:
259,975*0.24(rush)*0.1037(from table 3.2.2) = 6,4
*0.3858 =24,0
*0.5105 =31,7
Use formulas i) - iii) in chapter 3 on scenario 2-4.
Example: 6,4-(6.4*0.06(11+15)715)= 5,7
Table 3.3.3 also uses 259,975 as a base number.
Table 3.3.4. uses 108,390.
Otherwise the calculations are exactly similar to table 3.3.2.
Table 3.4.1.
Example for discretionary trips for scenario 4.
5,2 (from table 3.3.2) *2 61 (days) *3 0 (from table 3.2.1) +
74,8 ( 3.3.3) *261 ( ) * 5 ( ) +
73,2 ( 3.3.4) *104 ( ) * 4 ( ) =169,6
2Tables, chapter 4:
Table 4.1.1.
Example for scenario 2:
l-( 59,9/ 62,2)(from table 3.3.2)*16,3 mill. * 11 NOK = 6,64
1-(185,8/197,7) ( 3.3.3)*51,5 = 34,21
l-( 99,2/108,3) ( 3.3.4)*11,3 = 10,47
__________________________________________________ Total = 51,32
Table 4.1.2.
Scenario 2 
Peak hours:
Left in 
*(traffic*min./60)
Table
3.2.2*persons=
Discr.
Comm.
Business
19 . 0* (15,7* 
33.8*
128.5*
1.32/60) *0.1037*1.2 = 0,816
*0.3858 = 5,402
*0.5105 =27,174
_________ Total =33,392
Off-peak 
Discr. 
Comm. 
Business
19* (48,5* 0.67/60) *0.4118*1.2 =
*0.2168
*0.3715
_________________________ Total =40,83
Weekends 
Discr. 
Comm. 
Business
19* (10,3* 0.67/60) *0.7313*1.2 =
*0.1229
*0.1459
_________________________ Total = 5,086
3Table 4.1.3
Share
Left in trip Table
Peak hours:( traffic* type*minutes/60)*3.2.2 *persons=
Discr. : 19,0*(15,7 *0 .72 *0,25/60) *0.1037 *1.2
Comm. : 3 3,8 * ( *0.31 ) *0.3858
Bus. : 128,5*( *0.11 ) *0.5105
Off-oeak:
Discr. : (48,5 ) *0.4118
Comm. : ( ) *0.2168
Bus. : ( ) *0.3715
Weekends:
Discr: (10,3 ) *0.7313
Comm : ( ) *0.1229
Bus : ( ) *0.1459
Table 4.1.6.
The average welfare costs = net benefits / revenue
=  0,111 
= 0,317 
= 0,566
=1,365 
=0,550 
=1,272
=0,516 
=0,066 
=0,106
Where net benefits = lost surplus
+ collection costs 
- time savings
ENCLOSURE 1.
THE TOLL
